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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines one effect of inflation on the value 
of the firm— the Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis that debtor firms benefit 
from unanticipated inflation. The primary objective of this study is 
to determine what, if any, differences in performance exist as a 
result of net monetary debtor or creditor status during different 
inflationary conditions.
The literature on debtor versus creditor performance during inflation 
reflects a lack of agreement on the validity of the Keynes-Fisher 
Hypothesis. The findings of previous tests of debtor versus creditor 
performance are not homogeneous, and conflicts exist between such studies 
and the theoretical effects of unanticipated inflation. This dissertation 
suggests the lack of consensus is the result of improper tests and 
consideration of only the short run effects of anticipated inflation on 
holding period returns.
Initially, rank correlation tests were applied to a sample of 
Compustat firms to test for a relationship between net monetary debtor- 
creditor status and holding period returns. These tests indicated the 
inability of rank correlation methods to detect debtor benefits even 
in periods of unanticipated inflation. The differences between several 
of the prior studies are likely due to the use of this technique. It 
Is necessary first to control for several other factors in order to 
detect those effects which result from debtor-creditor status.
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A series of tests to isolate the effect of debtor-creditor status 
on holding period yields were conducted by constructing separate 
portfolios of debtor and of creditor firms, identical in all Important 
respects except net monetary debtor-creditor status. In this way, any 
statistically significant differences in holding period yields could be 
attributed to differences in debtor-creditor status. The findings 
generally were consistent with the hypothesis of this dissertation and 
with research identifying periods of unanticipated inflation. Specifically 
in periods with relatively high unanticipated inflation (1955-59 and 
after 1967), debtor firms demonstrated superior holding period returns.
In the interim period of more correctly anticipated inflation, no 
difference in the performance of debtor versus creditor portfolios was 
detected. However, two findings were not as expected. Creditor benefits 
appear in two periods. The five-year lagged holding period yields for 
creditor portfolios was superior to debtors in the 1969-73 and 1970-74 
periods, even though inflation was not found to be overanticipated in 
either of the preceding five-year periods. Second, debtor benefits do 
not reappear strongly after 1967 when the degree of unanticipated 
inflation was as great as before 1960.
Two trends were noted and examined as possible explanations of 
these unexpected findings. First, it was noted that the variance in 
expected inflation for a given period had been increasing in the late 
1960's. Increased uncertainty surrounding inflation forecasts would 
have the same effect as higher inflationary expectations, thereby 
decreasing debtor benefits and perhaps even causing creditor benefits 
in some periods. Second, the superior stock performance of net monetary
viii
debtors was observed only several years subsequent to periods of 
unanticipated inflation. As would be expected in a rational market, 
the superior performance of debtor firms was followed by an increase 
in the percentage of debtor firms. The increase was concurrent with 
the observed lag structure in performance.
This dissertation has provided comprehensive explanations of 
the inconsistencies of prior studies as well as empirical evidence 
supporting these explanations. It develops an hypothesis supported 
by empirical tests which reconciles the findings of previous studies 
with research measuring the degree of unanticipated inflation. Finally, 
the likely implication of recent trends is examined along with 




In a free enterprise economy business firms are subject to two 
general types of constraints, one internal to the firm and the other 
external. The first type of constraint is self-imposed and arises 
from decisions of management. The second includes a wide range of 
external economic influences. Because general economic conditions are 
beyond the dontrol of the firm, management must be able to adjust to 
these outside influences rapidly and with foresight. Such adjustments 
are complicated by the fact that the relative impact of various 
exogenous economic forces on business firms is subject to change 
over time. One of the most important changes which has occurred since 
World War II has been the continual and growing impact of inflation.
As Figure 1-1 illustrates, the inflationary period which began 
in 1940 has been different from all others in the history of our 
nation.^ Before World War II every major war began a period of 
inflation, and each wartime inflation was followed by a period of price 
deflation. In these post-war deflations, money decreased in value and 
lenders recouped what they had lost during the periods of rising prices.
‘'"This period of generally uninterrupted inflation which began in 
1940 is referred to as the post-war inflation, even though this period 
actually began before the end of World War II.
2George A. Christy and Peyton F. Roden, Finance: Environment and
Decisions, (New York, 1976), p. 20.
FIGURE 1-1
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Source: George A. Christy and Peyton F. Roden, Finance:
Environment and Decisions, (New York, 1976), p. 18.
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However, no such adjustment of prices has occurred since World War II.
Rising prices gradually became a recognized part of our economy.
As a result of the recognition and anticipation of inflation, research
conducted prior to 1940 concerning the impact of inflation on business
firms has become less applicable to the analysis of modern business
conditions. Moreover, the literature of finance in general lacks
operational guidelines for business managers with respect to the most
3appropriate use of debt. Specifically, what mixture of assets and 
liabilities will enable the firm to maximize shareholder wealth under 
conditions of continuing inflationary pressure? The findings of this 
dissertation may aid in the development of such policy guidelines.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The impact of inflation upon the value of business firms has long
been of interest to scholars in the fields of economics and finance.
However, the existing literature has tended to concentrate on the
4effects of inflation on welfare and income distribution, investor 
required rates of return,"* and income determination from the accounting
3Z. Lew Melnyk and Iqbal Mathur, "Inflation and Economic Profit­
ability of Business Firms: A Formal Statement of the Effect of Rising
Prices For Capital Assets," Economic Notes, (September-December, 1973) 
pp. 45-60.
4Louis DeAllessi, "Do Business Firms Gain From Inflation?" Journal 
of Business, (April, 1964), pp. 162-166.
^Richard M. Duvall and James Bullock, "Adjusting Rate of Return 
and Present Value for Price-Level Changes," The Accounting Review,
(July, 1965), pp. 568-573; and Donald A. Nichols, "A Note on Inflation 
and Common Stock Prices," Journal of Finance, (September, 1968) pp. 655- 
657.
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point of view. Since the early 1950's increasing emphasis has been
placed on various empirical studies which have attempted to identify,
and to some degree, measure the impact of inflation on business firms.^
A number of these studies have concentrated primarily on various tests
of the so called Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis that business firms are
0
debtors and therefore, benefit from inflation. Other more recent 
studies have tested the impact of debtor-creditor status as part of a 
more comprehensive framework considering the overall impact of inflation 
on business firms.^
Research into the impact of inflation on business firms has 
varied widely in a number of important areas. Most studies use the 
same criteria for identifying debtor and creditor firms, but some apply 
the criteria to average measures while others use only the first year.
The time periods are rarely identical, and many methods have been 
used for testing the data. Even the underlying assumptions are 
different in some studies. Due to these and other inconsistencies, it 
is not surprising that the results of research undertaken thus far have 
often been conflicting. One objective of this dissertation is a careful
^Reg S. Gynther, "Capital Maintenance, Price Changes, and Profit 
Determination," The Accounting Review, (October, 1970), pp. 712-730.
7A pioneer study in this area was Reuben A. Kessel, "Inflation 
Caused Wealth Redistribution: A Test of A Hypothesis," American Economic
Review, (March, 1956), pp. 128-141.
0
Reuben A. Kessel and Armen A. Alchian, "Effects of Inflation," 
Journal of Political Economy, (December, 1962), pp. 521-537.
9Hai Hong, "Inflation and The Market Value of the Firm: Theory
and Tests," Journal of Finance, (September, 1977), pp. 1031-1048.
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examination of prior research. Points of agreement and disagreement 
will be mentioned, accompanied by explanations for some of the apparent 
contradictions which exist.
One important omission in the research conducted thus far has 
been a clear explanation of the relationship between stock price 
performance tests of the Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis, and research on the 
response of interest rates to changes in price expectations. Therefore, 
a second goal of this paper will be to provide such an explanation. 
Specifically, there is much evidence to indicate that the continuing 
post-war inflation has caused inflationary expectations to become an 
increasingly important determinant of interest rates, especially after 
1960. A number of researchers have found evidence indicating a 
pronounced increase in the importance of price expectations as a 
determinant of interest rates CKmunred about 1960,^ and refer to this 
change in the determinants of interest rates as the "structural break 
of 1960". This dissertation seeks to explain clearly how this 
structural break should effect the validity of the Keynes-Fisher 
Hypothesis.
THE HYPOTHESIS
In the following chapter a thorough review of the pertinent 
literature from the fields of finance and economics is presented. By 
reviewing these findings we can develop the hypothesis of this dissertation.
^ T w o  authors presenting empirical evidence of a structural break 
were S. J. Turnovsky, "Empirical Evidence on The Formation of Price 
Expectations," Journal of American Statistics Association, (December,
1970) pp. 1441-1454; and William E. Gibson, "Interest Rates and Infla­
tionary Expectations: New Evidence," American Economic Review,
(December, 1972) pp. 854-865.
Previous studies have developed a method of differentiating debtor 
and creditor firms according to inflationary impact. This method 
concentrates on a comparison of the relative importance of the firm's 
monetary assets minus monetary liabilities. Some of these same studies 
tested the market performance of debtor and creditor firms and found 
evidence that debtor firms had outperformed creditor firms during 
periods of inflation. However, later studies found results which were 
in conflict with the earlier research in that they found little or no 
relationship between debtor status and holding period returns on common 
stock. In fact, the most recent studies have found evidence of a 
negative relationship between debtor status and holding period returns.
It is recognized that the impact of inflation on business firms 
depends upon inflationary expectations. Both the correctness of 
expectations and how quickly expectations are incorporated into interest 
rates have an influence on the impact of inflation on debtor versus 
creditor firms. Research conducted in the post-war period offers 
evidence of the evolutionary nature of inflation during this period. 
Specificially, as inflation continued after the war, interest rates 
adjusted more rapidly and more completely to inflationary expectations. 
Inflation was generally unanticipated after World War II. However, 
expectations adapted to continuing inflation, and from about 1959 
until 1967 forecasted rates of inflation were very close to actual 
rates. After 1967, unanticipated inflation began to reappear, and 
peaked during the 1972-1974 period. Considering this evidence on 
unanticipated inflation, it is possible to develop an hypothesis 
concerning the relationship between unanticipated inflation and holding
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period yields of debtor and creditor corporations during the post-war 
period.
It is the hypothesis of this dissertation that corporations which 
established and/or maintained debtor positions during periods of 
unanticipated inflation will demonstrate superior holding period yields 
when compared to corporations which established and/or maintained 
creditor positions during such periods. Furthermore, when unanticipated 
inflation declines, this difference in performance should decline, 
and when unanticipated inflation reappears the superior performance of 
debtor firms should reappear. Therefore, we expect to find superior 
holding period yields for debtor firms before 1960 and following 1967.
No significant difference in the performance of debtor and creditor 
firms should be expected during the interim period of correctly 
anticipated inflation.
SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This dissertation is concerned with the theoretical and empirical 
relationships between unanticipated inflation and holding period yields 
on the common stocks of debtor and creditor corporations. For the 
purposes of this study, no unlisted corporations, partnerships, or 
proprietorships will be considered. Also, all listed corporations 
subject to government regulation of profits will be excluded. The 
size of the corporations tested will not be considered because all 
tests of debtor-creditor status and holding period yield will be based 
on relative measures. Because of the data used, any conclusions 
drawn from the tests conducted in this dissertation will apply primarily
8
to large, listed, unregulated, industrial corporations. Any attempt to 
generalize the findings to include other types of firms would be 
highly speculative.
The tests conducted in this study include only post-1952 data.
Due to the unique nature of the post-war inflation, conclusions drawn 
from tests conducted during this time period may not be applicable to 
other periods.
A further limitation was the exclusion in Chapter IV of all other 
inflationary effects, such as depreciation (via taxes) and inventory 
costing methods. This was done in order to concentrate our efforts on 
the impact of debtor-creditor status on holding period yield. The 
reason for choosing this one factor is that although researchers 
generally agree on the impact of other effects, there has been disagree­
ment as to the significance of debtor-creditor status.
ORGANIZATION AND OBJECTIVES
The remainder of this dissertation is organized in the following 
manner. In Chapter II the relevant literature in finance and economics 
is reviewed. This review analyzes and compares the findings of studies 
which were foremost in the development of the hypothesis of this 
dissertation. This analysis indicates the relationship between finance 
studies of debtor versus creditor performance in periods of inflation, 
and economic research into the changing nature and impact of inflationary 
expectations. Evidence is presented indicating that the effects of 
inflation on debtor and creditor firms depends upon the degree to which 
inflation is anticipated and incorporated into interest rates as an
9
inflationary premium. As already mentioned, the accuracy of inflationary
expectations has varied in the post-war period. Various subperiods
are discussed as they relate to finance studies testing the relationship
between debtor-creditor status and holding period returns.
Three groups of finance studies with seemingly contradictory results
will be reviewed. The first group includes papers written between 1956 
11and 1963. These studies found evidence supporting the Keynes-
Fisher Hypothesis that debtors benefit from inflation. Later tests
conducted from 1970-1974 using similar data obtained mixed results; some
found a weak relationship between holding period returns and debtor
12status while others found no relationship. The most recent studies,
conducted since 1975, actually found a negative relationship between
13debtor status and holding period returns. By reviewing these studies 
in conjunction with interest rate research, we will see that these 
findings are actually consistent with the evolutionary nature of the
11Among the early studies are R. Kessel and A. Alchian, "Effects 
of Inflation," (1962); DeAlessi, "Do Business Firms Gain from Inflation?" 
(1964); and V. A. Broussalian, "Unanticipated Inflation: A Test of the
Debtor-Creditor Hypothesis," Ph.D. dissertation (UCLA, 1961). This 
group of researchers used primarily pre-1960's data.
12This group of articles Included G. L. Bach and J. B. Stephenson, 
"Inflation and the Redistribution of Wealth," The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, (February, 1974) pp. 1-13, and W. D. Bradford, "Inflation 
and the Value of the Firm," Southern Economics Journal, (January, 1974), 
pp. 414-427. These tests used primarily 1960's data.
13The most recent studies are A. Bodie, "Common Stocks as a Hedge 
against Inflation," Journal of Finance, (May, 1976), pp. 459-470; Hai 
Hong, "Inflation and the Market Value of the Firm: Theory and Test,"
Journal of Finance, (September, 1977), pp. 1031-1046; and J. Jaffee and 
G. Mandelker, '"The Fisher Effect' for Risky Assets: An Empirical
Investigation," Journal of Finance, (May, 1976), pp. 447-470. These 
test used data from all periods and considered factors other than 
debtor-creditor status.
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post-war inflation. Also, by analyzing the results of these studies, 
the logic leading to the hypothesis of this dissertation will be 
clarified.
Chapter III examines rank correlation methods used to test the 
relationship between holding period yields and debtor-creditor status.
The data sample, selection of time periods, and selection criteria 
are explained. The Spearman and Kendall rank correlation techniques 
are discussed, and the results of these tests reported. We expect 
these tests to reflect a high degree of correlation between debtor 
status and holding period yields when unanticipated inflation existed.
This relationship should decline when unanticipated inflation declines. 
Through an examination of the methods used in Chapter III, we are 
directed to the tests conducted in Chapter IV, which seeks to overcome 
many of the shortcomings of rank correlation tests.
Chapter IV contains the portfolio tests used to compare the 
performance of debtor versus creditor corporations. The logic 
surrounding the formation of portfolios of debtor and creditor firms, 
in order to isolate the effect of debtor-creditor status on holding 
period yields is explained. Also, the methods used to make the 
portfolios as identical as possible, except for debtor-creditor status, 
are detailed. The statistical techniques used for testing the performance 
of these portfolios are described, and the results of these tests 
reported. The findings were generally consistent with the hypothesis 
of this dissertation. Firms which established and/or maintained 
debtor positions during the pre-1960 and post-1967 periods of 
relatively high unanticipated inflation outperformed firms establishing
11
and/or maintaining creditor positions during those same periods. During 
the interim period of relatively low unanticipated inflation, no 
differences in performance was detected. These results are analyzed
and linked to the findings of previous studies.
Chapter V examines as yet unanswered questions about recent and
future trends. In Chapter V the findings of recent research are
also related to questions suggested by the results of the tests 
conducted in Chapter IV. This discussion explains the likely impact 
of recent changes in the uncertainity surrounding the formation of 
expectations, as it affects interest rates and thus, debtor-creditor 
performance. Included is an analysis of the post-1965 debt movement, 
and its probable impact on debtor-creditor performance via interest 
rates.
The final chapter, Chapter VI, contains a summary of the conclusions 
arising from tests of the hypothesis. It also contains an interpretation 
of these results and implications of the research findings for policy 
decisions, and recommendations of areas for further research.
CHAPTER II
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
The purpose of this chapter is to examine aspects of the literature 
of finance and economics related to the development of the hypothesis 
of this dissertation. The first part of this chapter examines early 
views of inflation and theories explaining how business firms should 
gain from inflation. In the second section of this chapter, early 
tests of the Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis are discussed. The objectives 
of this section are: to document the method used for differentiating
debtor and creditor firms; to examine the contention that business 
firms are debtors; and to review the methodology and the results of 
early indirect market tests of the Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis, which, 
with one exception, supported the contention that the common stocks 
of debtor firms outperformed those of creditor firms during pre-1960 
inflations.
The third part of this review will center around the findings of 
post-1965 tests of the Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis, concentrating on the 
apparent conflicts with earlier studies. The fourth and final section 
of this chapter will examine the changes in the link between inflationary 
expectations and interest rates which have occurred in the post-war 
period. Economic studies will be cited to provide evidence that interest 
rates were biased estimators of inflation prior to 1960 and after 1967
12
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when inflation was largely unanticipated. However, during the interim 
period of more correctly anticipated inflation interest rates were much 
less biased. A careful review of these studies will indicate why this 
dissertation is a logical extension of the literature, as well as a 
needed link between the literature of finance and economics.
EARLY VIEWS ON INFLATION
Until the late 1960Ts, businessmen, economists, and the general 
public assumed that a period of rising prices acts as a stimulus to the 
economy and that, in general, business firms are debtors and, therefore, 
gain from inflation. This widespread belief that business firms "gain" 
from inflation was popularized by John Maynard Keynes and Irving Fisher.^ 
Today this conclusion is stated in some form in most economic texts as 
in the following quotation from a popular economic text:
Inflation also redistributes income by altering the 
relationship between debtors and creditors. Specifically, 
inflation tends to benefit debtors at the expense of
creditors. . . As prices go up, the value of the dollar
comes down. Thus, because of inflation, the borrower is 
given ’dear' dollars but pays back 'cheap' dollars.
In most cases the statement that business firms gain from inflation
is not accompanied by a clear, consistent explanation of what the
term gain actually means. To avoid any confusion the following
definition of the term shall be assumed throughout the remainder of
this dissertation.
^■John Maynard Keynes stated this view in his Tract on Monetary Reform, 
(London: 1923), p. 21, and Irving Fisher made similar statements in his
book, Inflation, (New York, 1933), p. 62.
?C. R. McConnell, Economics (7th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978),
pp. 199-200.
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An economic unit gains from inflation if, as a result 
of inflation, the rate of growth in its nominal wealth is 
greater than the increase in the general level of prices 
plus the real rate of interest.^
WHY FIRMS GAIN FROM INFLATION
Explanations of why business firms gain from inflation usually
fall into one of the three following categories. The most prevalent
explanation is that of the Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis discussed above.
The key argument to this hypothesis is that business firms borrow and,
therefore, contract to repay fixed dollar amounts. When unanticipated
inflation occurs, the decline in the real value of money which results
causes losses to creditors and gains to business firms because the real
value of the debt is diminished. The essence of this particular
explanation rests on the assumption that interest rates fail to completely
reflect price level changes during inflation. The Keynes-Fisher
Hypothesis then is based on the assumption that interest rates have
traditionally been biased estimators of future prices. Without this
assumption, the conclusion that creditors lose and debtors gain does
not necessarily follow.
A second explanation for the conclusion that businesses gain from
4inflation is the Wage Lag hypothesis developed by Hamilton and 
3DeAlessi, "Do Business Firms Gain From Inflation?" p. 162.
^Earl J. Hamilton, "Profit Inflation and the Industrial Revolution, 
1751-1800," Quarterly Journal of Economics, (February, 1942), pp. 256-273; 
and "Prices as a Factor in Business Growth," Journal of Economic History, 
(Fall, 1952), pp. 325-349.
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Mitchell."* According to this hypothesis, wages do not increase as 
rapidly as prices during period of demand pull inflation. Therefore, 
profit margins expand, benefiting any firm which has employees. Of 
course, the proponents of this view realize wages rise, but they merely 
contend that they do not go up as fast as prices in inflationary periods, 
nor do they go down as fast as prices in periods of deflation.** This 
theory is most applicable in labor intensive economies and industries.
A third explanation of how business firms gain from inflation 
is based on the existence of business inventories.^ These inventories 
are generally sold at prices which reflect mark-ups based on current 
costs. If current replacement costs are greater than the original 
cost due to inflation, then the business will reap an inflation 
premium due to its mark-up policy. However, while it is true that 
business profits may appear larger as a result of these inflationary 
inventory profits, this is purely a result of the original cost 
accounting method.
While the last two explanations of how businesses gain from 
inflation are worthy of further examination, this dissertation will 
concentrate only on the Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis.
"*Wesley Clair Mitchell, A History of Greenbacks with Special Reference 
to the Ecnomic Consequences of Their Issues (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1903).
£
R. A. Kessel and A. A. Alchain, "The Meaning and Validity of the 
Inflation-Induced Lag of Wages Behind Prices," American Economic Review, 
(March, 1960), pp. 43-66.
^Reuben A. Kessel, "Test of A Hypothesis," p. 129.
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Two key elements are necessary to the logic of the Keynes-Fisher
hypothesis. First, there is the assumption that business firms are 
8debtors. Second, there must be, if not explicitly at least implicitly,
the assumption that interest rates fail to fully reflect price level
9changes during inflationary periods. Both of these elements have 
been extensively tested in the literature of finance and economics.
EARLY TESTS OF THE KEYNES-FISHER HYPOTHESIS
The first wave of studies which attempted to test the Keynes- 
Fisher Hypothesis was primarily concerned with the relationship between 
aggregate stock market levels and inflation rates. These studies were 
based on data from periods of mild inflation prior to the structural 
break of 1960, and, with one exception, provided evidence which supports 
the Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis.
Kessel (1956)
One of the earliest test of the Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis was
11conducted by Reuban A. Kessel. Kessel considered two historically
O
G. L. Bach and A. Ando, "The Redistributional Effects of Inflation," 
Review of Economics and Statistics, (February, 1957), pp. 1-13.
9William E. Gibson, "Price-Expectation Effects on Interest Rates," 
Journal of Finance, (March, 1970), pp. 19-34.
"^DeAlessi and Broussalian obtained results supporting the Keynes- 
Fisher Hypothesis. These two works will not be covered in this section; 
however, see: DeAlessi, "Do Business Firms Gain from Inflation?" and
Broussalian, "Unanticipated Inflation."
"^Reuben A. Kessel, "Test of A Hypothesis."
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observed regularities: (1) banks as a class lose during inflation,
in that their stocks do not increase in price as much as the general 
level of prices; and (2) stock price indexes generally rise slightly 
less than the general level of prices. These two historical observations 
appear to refute the Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis.
In order to test the assumption that business firms are debtors,
Kessel selected a series of five samples, four of which were randomly
drawn from the New York Stock Exchange industrial listing. The other
sample consisted of sixteen stocks randomly drawn from the population
of bank shares listed in the New York Times. These samples were
divided into debtors and creditors by calculating monetary assets minus
12monetary liabilities. Banks are usually thought of as debtors because 
of their large ratio of debt to equity. However, when Kessel sorted 
out the monetary accounts from the real accounts, he found all 16 
banks had monetary assets which exceeded monetary liabilities. There­
fore, all 16 banks were creditors. In the other four samples of 
industrial corporations, debtors and creditors were approximately equal
12Kessel divided firms into creditors and debtors using the 
following classification system. This system is widely accepted in 
the literature and will be followed in this dissertation.














in number. Due to this finding, Kessel concluded that it is incorrect
13to assume that business firms are debtors.
Kessel also examined the belief that debtors gain from inflation. 
This was accomplished by an examination of the stock price performance 
of the debtor firms versus the creditor firms. His sample of bank 
stocks rose in price by 47 percent from the end of 1942 to the end 
of 1948, while the wholesale price index rose by 60 percent. In the 
first sample of 30 industrial corporations, the debtor corporations 
stock increased in value by 81 percent while the creditor corporations 
stock declined in value by 13 percent during the same time period.
These results were significant at a .0025 level. Similar results were 
obtained for this sample using stock prices from the end of 1939 to 
the end of 1948 and from the end of June 1942 to the end of June 1948.
Kessel also used rank correlation to determine if the degree of 
debtor or creditor status was related to the change in stock prices.
The 30 stocks were ranked from most extreme debtor to most extreme 
creditor and these rankings were correlated to stock price performance. 
This correlation proved to be significant at the .002 level.
Kessel obtained similar results from the other three industrial 
samples for both periods of inflation and deflation. In each case
13Louis DeAlessi, in "Do Business Firms Gain From Inflation?", 
reports similar findings on the frequency of business debtors and 
creditors in the U.S. However, in a sample of corporations from the 
United Kingdom the percentage of debtor corporations was significantly 
higher. In that sample, about 80 percent of the firms selected from 
1948 to 1956 data were debtors. Evidence will be presented in Chapter 
V, indicating that the percentage of debtor firms in the U.S. increased 
after 1965.
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debtor stocks out-performed creditor stocks in inflationary periods and 
vice versa in periods of deflation. Also, the degree of debtor or 
creditor status was correlated to the stock price performance.
The results of Kessel's research suggest a rationale for the
uniformities reported by empirical investigators of past inflations in
other countries: That bank stocks did not keep pace with increases in
the general level of prices, and that prior to the 1950's, stock prices
14in general just kept pace with increases in the price level. Kessel 
concluded that bank stocks perform poorly because banks are creditors.
He explained the movement of stock price indexes by the fact that such 
indexes were composed of both debtor and creditor securities in 
approximately equal numbers. Because of this fact, a consolidation of 
the monetary position of all the firms which compose such an index would 
essentially represent neutral shares. Therefore, Kessel's study did 
not support the hypothesis that business firms are debtors, but did 
support the hypothesis that debtor firms did benefit from inflation 
during the time periods mentioned. The latter finding is critical to 
the logic of the hypothesis to be tested in this dissertation.
Kessel cited a number of studies reporting such findings; for 
example, Bresciani-Turroni, Economics of Inflation, (London: 1937)
pp. 253, 298; J. H. Rogers, The Process of Inflation in France, (New 
York, 1929) pp. 212-213, 265; D. L. Grove, "The Role of the Banking 
System in the Chilean Inflation," International Monetary Fund Staff 
Papers, (September, 1951) pp. 55. However, more recent studies in 
this country have found average rates of return on common stocks 
greater than the average rates of inflation. The most comprehensive 
study was that of Lawrence Fisher and James H. Lprie , "Rates of Return 
on Investments in Common Stocks," Journal of Business, (January, 1964), 
pp. 1-24.
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Bach and Ando (1957)
One study containing findings somewhat different from those of 
Kessel was conducted by G. L. Bach and Albert Ando.^ Their study 
examined the redistributional effects of inflation on the governmental 
and household sectors of the economy. However, it is their research 
concerning the effects of inflation upon corporations which is related 
to the subject of this dissertation. The period examined in their 
research, 1939-1952, was one of moderate inflation.
Bach and Ando tested two basic propositions: (1) inflation
redistributes real purchasing power from creditors to debtors when 
debts are stated in fixed dollar amounts; (2) to the extent that 
inflation is correctly anticipated, the redistribution effects indicated 
above will tend to be negated, except where readjustments of terms on 
economic contracts are prevented or retarded by governmental rules, 
the existence of long-term contracts, and unequal knowledge or unequal 
bargaining power.
To test these propositions Bach and Ando initially selected a 
random sample of 100 companies from the 1939 Moody’s Industrials.
Their final sample was reduced to 52 firms due to mergers, incomplete 
data, failures, and other occurences between 1939 and 1952. These 
sample data were divided into three subperiods 1939-1946, 1946-1949, 
and 1949-1952 because many firms reversed their position from debtors 
to creditors or vice versa during the 1939-1952 period.
^ G .  L. Bach and Albert Ando, "The Redistribution Effects of 
Inflation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, (February, 1957), 
pp. 1-13.
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Two measures of performance were used In the Bach-Ando study:
(1) the change in the market value of the stock, and (2) net return 
on investments. Contrary to Kessel's finding, Bach and Ando's results 
did not confirm the prediction that debtor companies will gain from 
inflation. They found that from 1939-1945 the common stocks of creditor 
firms in their sample rose slightly more (231%) than those of debtor 
firms (224%). From 1946-1949 debtor stocks lost more (-35%) than 
creditor stocks (-30%). However, in the 1945-1952 period debtors 
gained (54%) while creditors gained (13%). Rank correlation coefficients 
of creditor-debtor status ranked against increase in stock prices were 
.23 for the first period, .09 for the second period, and .18 for the 
third period. These mixed results led Bach and Ando to believe 
that while the debtor-creditor effect does occur, income statement 
factors were generally more dominant.
Bach and Ando offered a number of possible explanations why their 
correlation coefficients were lower than those of Kessel. These 
included: different samples, shorter time periods, classification of
companies as debtors or creditors based on the beginning data only, 
their use of median rather than mean measures of stock price changes 
for debtor and creditor groups, their addition of net return on 
investment or some combination of these factors.
It is important to note that Bach and Ando obtained results more 
similar to those of Kessel when they used the common stock test for 
the entire 1939-1952 time period. For the entire period the rank 
correlation of debtor-creditor rank against stock price performance was 
.26; this was higher than the correlation coefficient for any of the
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three subperiods. They stated that they were unable to explain why 
the value of the correlation coefficient was so much higher for the 
longer time period, and therefore, doubted its significance.
Bach and Ando never mentioned that the interest rate mechanism 
was largely inoperative during their 1946-1949 subperiod. This is 
unusual since the results of the common stock test for this period 
were opposite to those of the other two subperiods. Only during 
this period did creditor stocks out-perform debtor stocks, and only 
in this period did both debtor and creditor stocks show negative 
price increases. The relatively short subperiods may have influenced 
their results if there existed a lag between a change in debtor- 
creditor status of the firm and any resulting change in stock price 
performance.
THE ROLE OF EXPECTATIONS
Kessel and Alchian (1962)
In another study of the effects of inflation on business firms, 
Kessel and Armen A. Alchian examined unanticipated inflation, the 
transition to anticipated inflation (the intermediate stage as they 
called it) and fully anticipated inflation.^ A thorough understanding 
of these stages of "inflationary evolution" is useful in fully 
appreciating the key role played by expectations of inflation in 
determining the impact of inflation on business firms. If inflation 
is unanticipated, that is, if the holders of monetary assets expect
"^Reuben A. Kessel and Armen A. Alchian, "Effects of Inflation," 
p. 524.
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prices to remain unchanged, then one set of implications is generated. 
However, if the holders of monetary assets, taken as a group, expect 
the general level of prices to rise, then an entirely different set 
of implications follow.
Kessel and Alchian explain quite clearly the various implications 
as inflationary expectations evolved from unanticipated to fully 
anticipated. If inflation is unanticipated, net monetary debtors gain 
at the expense of net monetary creditors. Also, governments, that is 
taxpayers, gain at the expense of the holders of government obligations, 
both interest bearing and non-interest bearing. As inflation continues 
and awareness of the rise in prices grows, the transition to a correctly 
anticipated inflation begins. During this stage, the quantity of real 
balances demanded decreases and the real value of the nominal stock of 
monetary assets falls. However, this rise in prices, unlike the rise 
in prices during unanticipated inflation, represents an adjustment by 
money holders to the increased costs of holding monetary assets. This 
may decrease the efficiency with which the economy utilizes its resources 
and may result in a loss to holders of monetary assets. Most Important 
to this dissertation is that, in transition, all existing securities 
are re-valued so that their yields will reflect an unbiased estimate 
of the future course of prices. As a result of this adjustment process, 
the holders of all fixed return securities, both government and private, 
incur capital losses.
If inflation continues long enough it may reach a state that 
Kessel and Alchian call "correctly anticipated" inflation. If Inflation 
Is correctly anticipated, prices will rise at a constant rate. Also,
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the continued decline in the purchasing power of money will induce a 
series of substitutions for money and monetary assets. In particular, 
real assets, gold, real estate, diamonds, etc., are substituted for 
monetary assets as a means of storing value. In this latter stage, 
inflation, essentially a tax on money, has its most devastating influence 
upon labor-intensive firms, while firms with low cash-to-equity ratios 
are least affected. Consequently, the demand for capital rises and 
rents rise relative to wages. Therefore, the fraction of national 
income devoted to capital formation increases.
Considering the characterisitics Kessel and Alchian enumerated,
it is possible to classify past inflationary periods as they conform
to these descriptions. By doing this, it is possible to generate
hypotheses about the effects of these past inflationary periods as
they pertain to the Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis. The criteria used by
Kessel and Alchian to characterize unanticipated inflation tend to be
most closely related to the period from 1954-1959. The description
of the transitional stage most closely resembles the 1960's and the
1969-1972 period would more closely conform to their description of
17a correctly anticipated inflation.
Figure II-l plots measures of anticipated and unanticipated
18inflation. As one can observe from this graph, anticipated inflation
^These conclusions were based on an examination of the relation­
ships between rates of change in thegeneral level of prices and the 
level of wages, levels of employment, and rates of capital formation, 
all of which may be found in the Survey of Current Business and The 
Historical Statistics of the United States.
18For an explanation of the method used to approximate anticipated 
versus unanticipated inflation, the reader should refer to Joseph Bisignano, 
"The Effect of Inflation on Savings Behavior," Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco Economic Review, (December, 1975) p. 24.
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went from about one to two percent during the first half of the 1960’s. 
From mid-1967 to 1970 anticipated inflation grew rapidly and reached 
four percent. After 1970 anticipated inflation appeared to stablize 
between four and five percent until 1972. By observing the unanticipated 
inflation component, one may observe how the public gradually learned 
to adjust to continual price increases. In fact, during the early 1970's 
unanticipated inflation fell, actually becoming negative in 1971 and 
1972.
FIGURE II-l 
RECENT HISTORY OF INFLATION
Annual *o 
rate of growth
U n a n tic ip a te d  In fla tio n
A n tic ip a te d  In f la t io n
-2-2
10751065
Source: Joseph Bisignano, "Inflation and the Efficiency of Capital
Markets," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
(Summer, 1976) p. 22.
The effects of anticipated inflation were explained by Brian 
19Motley. He concluded that if inflation becomes anticipated to the
19Brian Motley, "Inflation and Stock Values," Journal of Finance, 
(June, 1969) p. 531.
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degree that the negotiation of loan contracts is treated by both 
borrowers and lenders as a process involving real rather than monetary 
magnitudes, the proposition that equity holders gain at the expense 
of lenders will no longer hold true because bargains would be struck 
in terms of the real rate of interest rather than in the money rate 
of interest.
None of the early studies included time periods during which the 
expectations of stock purchasers and lenders varied from almost totally 
unanticipated inflation in the beginning to almost total anticipation 
in the latter stages. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
results of studies conducted prior to 1960 would be very different 
from tests of the Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis which were conducted later 
and included post-1960 data.
POST-1965 TESTS OF THE KEYNES-FISHER HYPOTHESIS
As the rate of inflation increased after 1965, research into 
various aspects of the effects of inflation on the business firm also 
intensified. The traditional approach of attributing differentials 
in stock price performance to debtor effects alone was abandoned.
Bach and Stephenson (1974)
G. L. Bach and J. B. Stephenson attempted to test the effects of
inflation on business firms by combining depreciation and debtor- 
20creditor effects. Firms were classified on the basis of their 
20Bach and Stephenson, "Inflation and the Redistribution of 
Wealth."
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exposure to inflation. Bach and Stephenson observed that during 
inflationary periods depreciation charges are fixed while replacement 
costs of assets are increasing; therefore, all companies with 
depreciable assets lose because they pay excessive amounts in taxes. 
The basic hypothesis Bach and Stephenson attempted to test was that 
the stock price performance of debtor firms should be better than 
that of creditor firms, and the performance of low depreciation 
firms should surpass that of high depreciation firms.
A basic theoretical problem with the approach used by Bach and 
Stephenson was their failure to recognize the different impact of 
anticipated versus unanticipated inflation. Depreciation effects 
will lead to disproportionally higher taxes regardless of whether 
inflation is anticipated or unanticipated, while only unanticipated 
inflation will cause a redistribution of wealth from creditor to 
debtor firms. Because of their failure to recognize this fact, Bach 
and Stephenson combined these two effects into a measure they called 
"inflationary exposure". Due to this logical inconsistency, it is 
not surprising that the results yielded were mixed and inconclusive.
Bradford (1974)
21A model constructed by William D. Bradford included both 
monetary and depreciation effects as separate effects. Bradford's 
study tested the same premises, the Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis, 
previously tested by Kessel (4), DeAlessi (1), and Bach and Ando (21).
^William Bradford, "Inflation and the Value of the Firm."
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However, none of these previous studies included depreciation effects.
Using data based upon the samples used by Bach and Ando, Bradford 
performed six different independent tests.
The first test employed a regression equation of the form:
Y = a + b ^  + b2x2 + u,
where Y refers to the change in real wealth,
b^ regression estimate of impact of monetary position, 
b2 regression estimate of impact of depreciation,
x^ is the weighted sum of the average net monetary asset 
position of the firm,
x2 is the weighted depreciation position of the firm, and 
u is the random error term.
The results of this regression test are shown in Table II-l. In this 
table represents the regression results when depreciation was 
calculated as the average annual depreciation charges, and where D2 
is the depreciation calculated as the average annual net fixed assets.
In both cases W is the average annual total market value of the equity. 
These regression results found the depreciation variable to be signifi­
cant based upon regression t test for both the 1949-52 and 1948-56 
time periods. The fact that this variable was not significant for 
the 1952-1955 time period is not surprising, considering the price 
stability during that time period. Hoxrever, it is surprising that 
the monetary position of the firms was not found to be significant 
in any time period.
Bradford also used the t test for the difference between two 
means. For this test the population was divided into four classifications: 
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Regression D./W d 2/w D./W d 2/w Uj/W 0 /W Dx/W d 2/w
Coefficient:
-0.42 -1.41 3.97 4.85 1.01 2.95 3.42 1.02
*1 (0.84) (0.91) (3.81) (3.12) (0.91) (2.78) (3.16) (0.91)
AAA AAA AAA AA A AA A AA A
-4.11 -3.01 5. ■'0 1.62 -3.88 -3.01 -5.01 -4.26
* 2 (1.73) (1.03) (4.67) (1.54) (0.97) (0.96) (1.60) (1.01)
R 2 0.21 0.23 0.07 0.09 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.32
Fins? which wers debtors nr creditor* all nine years of the period studied. 
( ) Represents Che standard error of the regression coefficient
* • Significant at the 0.10 level
•a *  - significant at the 0.05 level
a a a  •  significant at the 0.01 level
Source: W. D. Bradford, "Inflation and the Value of the Firm,"
Southern Economic Journal, (January 1974) p. 420.
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debtors, and low depreciation creditors. The results of the t test 
based upon comparisons of the mean gains of these groups are shown in 
Table II-2. In the 1949-52 and 1948-56 periods, the signs for all 
tests are as predicted by the hypothesis. The greater the debtor 
position and the smaller the depreciation charges, the better the 
company's performance; and the greater the creditor position and the 
greater the depreciation charges the poorer the company's performance. 
Again, the stable period 1952-55 yielded mixed results.
Results of the Mann-Whitney Test, also shown in Table II-2, 
corroborated the results of the regression and t tests. The results 
of this rank correlation test were generally consistent for the 1945-52 
and 1948-56 periods, and once again had little predictive ability in 
the 1952-55 period. For the first two periods mentioned the values 
were significant at least at the 10 percent level for 33 of the 40 
tests conducted. Only one of the 16 tests for the 1952-55 period was 
significant.
Bradford also conducted a portfolio test based upon an investment 
strategy consistent with his hypothesis. Bradford's hypothesis 
states that during inflation a portfolio of net debtor firms would 
out-perform net creditor firms, and a portfolio of low depreciation 
firms would out-perform a portfolio of high depreciation firms.
Bradford compared the performance of portfolios selected according to 
this strategy with the performance of portfolios selected using an 
opposite strategy and using a random selection process. He found 
some support for his hypothesis. Using the Kendall Rank Correlation 
(tau) test, he found significant dif fereiices in performance at the
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TABLE II-2
T TEST, MANN-WHITNEY TEST
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Source: W. D. Bradford, "Inflation and the Value of the Firm,"
Southern Economic Review, (January 1974) p. 422.
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12 percent level with the data covering the 1948-56 period, and at the 
10 percent level for the 1949-52 period.
The samples were also tested to determine whether the values of 
the population from which one of the samples was drawn were stochastic­
ally larger than the values of the population from which the other 
sample was drawn. Although the signs of the test statistic were all 
consistent with the model, the null hypotheses was rejected at a 
higher level when monetary position was considered. Therefore,
Bradford concluded that monetary position was not as influential a 
factor as depreciation position or a combination of depreciation and 
monetary positions.
Hong (1977)
More recently Hai Hong examined the differential effects of
22inflation on individual business firms. Hong tested the hypotheses 
that, ceteris paribus, the stock price of a firm is higher (a) the 
higher its net debtor position; (b) the lower its proportion of fixed 
assets; and (c) the lower the degree of understatement of cost of 
goods sold.
These hypotheses were tested by means of a cross-sectional linear 
regression equation. Mean returns on common stocks (for given holding 
periods)were regressed on the three asset variables. Because returns 
are assumed linear in their systematic risk (B), B was also included 
as an explanatory variable. The cross-sectional equation tested by
22Hai Hong, "Inflation and the Market Value of the Firm."
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Hong was:
YjL = x + a ^  + a.jX^ + a2x2i + a3x3i + U i ^  = 1’ 2’ • • • n)
where x = constant
= systematic risk of ith firm
_ net debtor position
li book value of the firm
fixed assets 
2i book value of the firm
inventory cost understatement per unit inflation 
3i book value of the firm
= monthly return on firm i, averaged over the holding 
period
The results of this regression using COMPUSTAT data for three 
time periods, 1954-59, 1959-63, and 1964-68, are shown in Table II-3.
The first line coefficients are those obtained with no omission of 
variables, the second line shows regression estimates where B was 
omitted, and the third when and x^ were omitted.
The results indicate that heavily-capitalized firms perform worse 
than firms with relatively less depreciation. Also, the effect of 
undercosting inventory could not be rejected at the 10 percent level 
for the first two periods. Most surprising is the total lack of 
evidence to support the debtor-creditor hypothesis. This is especially 
puzzling when one considers the 1954-58 period, a period of under­
anticipation of the rate of inflation.
This article byHOng and other similar recent articles have offered 
evidence which appear to contradict the Keynes-Fisher (debtor-creditor) 
hypothesis. When one examines the changing nature of the post-war
TABLE II-3
C r o s s - S e c t i o n a l  R ec. r e s s io n  o f  M e a n  M o n t h l y  R e t u r n s  o n  R is k  a n d  W e a l t h  T r a n s f e r
V a r a i b le s  
(  } ', = a  + a 0fi, +  fl|A'|, +  uj.V2, +
Const. Sys. Risk Debt Plant Inv.
Period a ° i "2 r 2
1 .0083 .0068 .0006 - .0 1 4 3 -  .0099 0.73
(2.75) (3 .18)* (0.18) ( - 3 . 8 6 ) ' ( - 1 . 5 7 ) "
(1964-68)
.0165 .0055 - .0 1 9 4 -  .0079 0.59
(8.71) (1 .61 )** ( - 4 . 8 0 ) “ ( - 1 .0 4 )
p«= 0.033
-.0 0 1 1 .0106 -.0 0 6 7 0.52
( - 0 .5 0 ) (4 .51)*
•©rsi1
2 .0087 -  .0043 - .0 0 2 7 -.0 0 7 7 - .0 0 7 4 0.31
(2.00) ( - 1 .1 8 ) ( -  0.66) ( - 2 . 3 2 ) ' ( - 1 7 1 ) "
(1959-63 )
.0039 -.0 0 4 7 -.0 0 6 1 - .0 0 7 7 0.28
(2.64) ( - 1 .6 9 ) * * ( -  2 .00 )' ( - 1 . 7 6 ) "
p -0 .0 1 2
.0023 - .0 0 1 5 -  .0063 0.17
(0.68) ( - 0 .4 4 ) ( - 2 .1 0 ) *
3 .0140 .0047 -  .0007 -.0 1 2 2 -  .0035 0.44
(5.83) (2 .54)* ( - 0 .1 9 ) ( - 3 . 1 4 ) ' ( - 0 .6 3 )
(1954-58)
.0180 .0014 -  .0106 - .0 0 4 2 0.25
(9.02) (0.34) ( - 2 . 4 4 ) ' ( - 0 .6 6 )
p -0 .0 1 6
.0103 .0035 -  .0042 0.13
(4.68) (1 .59 )** ( - 1 .0 2 )
Notes',
1. Figures in parentheses are r-values.
2. ( * )  indicates significant at the 5% level on a one-tail /-test. ( • • )  at 10%.
Source: Hai Hong, "Inflation and the Market Value of the Firm
Theory and Tests," p. 1042.
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inflation; however, it is not surprising that the impact of debtor- 
creditor status on stock price performance has diminished.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE POST-WAR INFLATION
If, in fact, inflationary evolution has occurred during the time 
period in question in this dissertation, expectations about the 
future path of prices should have changed. Such a change is evidenced 
by the findings of research since World War II into the determinants 
of interest rates. These interest rate studies offer evidence which 
supports the division of periods developed by Kessel and Alchian.
Increased Awareness of Inflation
In the past, some economists held the opinion that interest 
rates failed to fully reflect price changes, and that the public failed 
to understand that inflation diminished the value of money. Irving 
Fisher stated:
That the value of money does not change is, therefore, 
one of the world's great illusions. We all begin under the 
sway of this illusion. If prices go up or down we think, 
at first, whatever it may be that puts them up or down, it 
is not changing the value of money. The fault, we believe, 
must be in the changing goods, the profiteer, or the ^
"bloated bondholder," or Wall Street, or the government.
From the beginning of World War II into the 1970's, the United
States enjoyed a period of practically uninterrupted prosperity, and
also, a long period of rising prices. Inflation has become a global
economic phenomenon, and through the news media this fact has been
impressed upon the population. As a result of this attention,
23Irving Fisher, Inflation (New York, 1933) p. 46.
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reinforced by continual exposure to rising prices, the public has grown
more aware of the real value of money. The populace of the United
States may be less subject to money illusion now than at any other
time in the post-war period.
In examining the literature containing explanations and empirical
tests of the link between price changes as they effect expectations
and expectations as they affect interest rates, one can observe the
likely impact of this increased awareness of inflation upon interest 
24rates. This evidence is essential to the hypothesis of the declining 
importance of the Keynes-Fisher hypothesis in the 1952-1975 period.
Price Expectations and Interest Rates
In 1923 J. M. Keynes stated his belief that:
In countries where the currency has not collapsed
completely, there has seldom or never existed sufficient
general confidence in a further rise or fall of prices
to cause the short-term rate of interest to rise above
9 5ten percent per annum, or, fall below one percent. J 
Keynes' observation is in conflict with recent experience and 
indicates how radically the post-war inflation differs from previous 
economic experience. It is not that expectations were slower to 
adjust to actual price experience before 1960 than after. It is that, 
once formed, expectations have substantially less than their theoretically 
expected effects on interest rates in the earlier period.
24For tests and explanations of the increasing impact of inflationary 
expectations, the reader is directed to J. A. Frenkle, "Inflation and 
the Formation of Expectations," Journal of Monetary Economics (October 
1975) pp. 403-442.
25 ̂ J. M. Keynes, Tract on Montary Reform (London, 1923) p. 21.
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While contemporary economists tend to agree on the identity of
the forces affecting interest rates, they tend to disagree over the
26relative importance of these forces. For many years after the 
Keynesian revolution economists emphasized the inverse relationship 
between money and interest rates. However, more recently, in part as 
a result of extented periods of rising interest rates accompanied by 
increases in the money stock and prices, economists have turned their 
attention to the effects of income and price expectations on interest 
rates.
The theoretical operation of price expectations effects on interest 
rates was set forth by Irving Fisher, but apart from his evidence, 
little empirical work had been done in this area until after the 
structural break of 1960. Recent studies have documented the 
increasing importance of the Fisher effect in the United States and 
have attributed an important role to the influence of price changes 
in explaining observed interest rate movements, especially during the 
1960’s and 1970's.27
26William Gibson and George Kaufman, Monetary Economics: Readings
on Current Issues (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), p. 301.
27Philip Cagan provided strong evidence of price-expectations 
effects in postwar European inflations "The Monetary Dynamics of Hyper­
inflation," in Milton Friedman, ed., Studies in the Quantity Theory of 
Money (Chicago, 1956), pp. 23-117. More recently Kajal Lahiri in his 
article, "Inflationary Expectations: Their Formation and Interest
Rate Effects," American Economic Review, (March, 1976), pp. 124-131, 
found that short-term expectations alone could explain more than 70 
percent of the variations in the nominal rate of interest in some 
periods since 1960. These articles and others offer evidence of the 
increasing importance of expectations during continuing inflation in 
the determination of interest rates. In economic theory this phenomena 
is referred to as the adaptive expectations hypothesis.
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By the latter part of the 1960's the structural break that occurred
in 1960 was becoming widely recognized by the Federal Reserve System,
as well as the rest of the financial community. A former president
of the Federal Reserve System expressed his awareness of this growing
relationship between inflation and interest rates by saying, "Those
of us who have worked in this field know that the thing that really
28makes high interest rates is inflation getting out of control."
The literature dealing with interest rate determination similarily
reveals a marked change in emphasis, with research based on time
periods prior to 1960 finding less evidence of the Fisher effect than
29those studies conducted using post-1960 data.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE FISHER EFFECT
Since the mid-1960's, there have been several empirical examinations 
of the effect of price changes on the market rate of interest which 
show the increasing importance of inflationary expectations upon 
interest rates during the 1954-1975 time period. This suggests a 
declining importance of the Keynes-Fisher hypothesis over this period.
28William McChesney Martin before the Ways and Means Committee of 
the House of Representatives, September 14, 1967.
29Several researchers have incorporated expectations of inflation 
into models of interest rate determination. However, the earlier 
studies found much longer lags between price changes and interest rate 
changes, and much less correlation between expectations of price 
level increases and increasing interest rates. See for example, Thomas 
J. Sargent, "Commodity Price Expectations and the Interest Rate," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, (February, 1969), pp. 127-140; and Kajal 
Lahiri, "Inflationary Expectations," (1976).
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Thomas Sargent (1969)
Thomas Sargent found interest rates and commodity prices highly 
and positively correlated in the U.S. over the period 1902-1940.
30He also found evidence of this phenomenon in several other countries. 
Sargent testedFisher's explanation of the Gibson Paradox using a 
multivariate model that measured the impact of several monetary and 
real variables on the nominal rate of interest. His results were 
surprisingly different from previous studies in two respects. First, 
inflation unexpectedly explained variations in interest rates to a 
larger degree than previously believed. The second unexpected result 
was the extremely long lag between an increase in prices and the 
ensuing effect upon interest rates. Sargent’s results indicated that 
the market's expectations of inflation adjusted very slowly. In fact, 
his research indicated that many years were required for a substantial 
portion of the adjustment to occur.
Gibson (1970)
Another study which generally supported Sargent's findings was
31conducted by William E. Gibson. Gibson's study was an attempt to 
measure the magnitude and the timing of the Fisher effect. Like 
Sargent, Gibson found evidence of long lags between changes in the 
price level and changes in interest rates. Gibson concluded that this 
delay in the expectations effect resulted not from a failure of
30Thomas Sargent, "Commodity Price Expectations and the Interest
Rate."
31William Gibson, "Price Expectations' Effects on Interest Rates."
40
expectations to adjust rapidly, but from the slowness of savings and 
investment to adjust to changes in price expectations.
As Figure II-2 shows, Gibson’s data in general supported the notion 
that people give greater weight to more recent price behavior when 
forming expectations. However, he found a cyclical pattern to this 
tendency. Rather than a smooth decline, the correlation coefficients 
for short term rates related to price changes decline, then rise, and 
then decline again. As Figure II-2 shows, peaks occurred in the third, 
sixth, and ninth years. Gibson believed this pattern occurred because 
people used their knowledge of past cycles in forming their expectations 
of future price and interest rate movements. He called this phenomenon 
the "reference cycle".
FIGURE I1-2
TIME RESPONSE OF INTEREST RATE CHANGES 
TO PRICE ACCELERATIONS
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Source: William E. Gibson, "Price Expectation Effects on Interest
Rates," Journal of Finance, (March, 1970), p. 28.
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The significance of Sargent's research and Gibson's research as 
related to the Keynes-Fisher hypothesis and the hypothesis of this 
dissertation is that the longer the lag between price changes and 
interest rate adjustments, the more interest rates become a biased 
underestimate of inflation. Therefore, borrowers should benefit due 
to the insufficient inflationary premiums in the interest rates contracted 
during such period. Sargent's and Gibson's studies also show that in 
addition to being spread over lengthy periods of time, adjustments in 
interest rates did not increase by the full amount of the percentage 
increase in the level of prices. Even though the lag varies in 
different studies, no one has questioned the existence of a lag between 
price changes and the resultant higher interest rates.. Therefore, at 
any point in time during periods of inflation, interest rates must be 
regarded as a biased underestimate of price changes due to the adjust­
ment lag. Furthermore, if as Gibson's data indicate, interest rates 
never fully reflect inflation, a partial bias will remain even after 
a lag.
Sargent's study was based on 1856 to 1938 data and Gibson's study 
used 1869 to 1963 observations of changes in prices and interest rates.
The findings of studies which have used more recent data provide 
useful insight into the unique nature of the post World War II inflation. 
It is the findings of these more recent studies with respect to the 
validity of the Keynes-Fisher hypothesis which lead to the hypothesis 
of this dissertation, since these results, particularly those which are 
based on post-1960 data, are very different from Sargent's .and Gibson's 
early findings.
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Yohe and Karnosky (1969)
In one study, Yohe and Karnosky, using 1952 to 1969 data, found
the effect of price level changes upon interest rates occur after a 
32very short lag. This finding is quite a different result from the 
research of Sargent and Gibson, which found lags so long that recent 
price behavior could be ignored in evaluating changes in observed 
interest rates. Yohe and Karnosky also found that price level changes 
exerted a much greater effect on interest rates in the 1960's than in 
the 1950's. In fact, their data indicated that a minority of the 
interest rate changes in the 1950's could be attributed to the Fisher 
effect, but in the 1960's price changes accounted for a majority of all 
fluctuations in interest rates.
Figure II-3 is a graph of Yohe and Karnosky's regression results. 
These values are found using yields on four to six month commercial
gpaper as a proxy for short-term interest rates, (rn ). The yield to
maturity on Aaa-rated corporated bonds is used as a measure of long
term interest rates, (rn^). Price expectations are approximated by
the rate of change in the consumer price index for all items, (P ).
The function
rn = a + a PC + a PC + . . . + a ,.,PC . t o  I t  2 t-1 n+1 t-n
where (rn.) the current nominal rate of interest is a function of a t o
the real rate of interest, plus an inflation premium based upon
expectations formed by weights (a , a , . . . a ) given to past changes1 Z n+1
32 William P. Yohe and Denis S. Karnosky, "Interest Rates and Price 
Level Changes," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, (December, 
1969) pp. 19-36.
FIGURE II-3
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Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, (December, 1969) p. 31.
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Qin the consumer price index (P ). This equation was estimated by least 
squares regression of rnfc on current and lagged values of price changes 
for n = 24, 36, and 48 months.
Figure II-4 shows that the regression results were very similar 
for seasonally adjusted and unadjusted data. Therefore, Yohe and 
Karnosky used the unadjusted results. These regressions indicate that 
price movements accounted for about 50 percent of the variance in 
interest rates between 1952 and late 1969. Figure II-3 shows that 
increasing the length of the lag from 24 to 48 months has little effect 
on the distribution of these coefficients. These results are consistent 
with the adaptive expectations hypothesis that great weight in the form­
ation of price expectations comes from quite recent experience with 
relatively small weight given to price movements in the distant past.
EXPECTATIONS AND THE FISHER EFFECT
More recent research has added further support to the findings of 
Yohe and Karnosky and suggested a rationale for their differences from 
earlier studies of Gibson and Sargent. Three separate studies by 
Turnovsky, Gibson, and Lahiri, using data from time periods similar to 
those used by Yohe and Karnosky, found evidence of a change in the 
relationship between price expectations and interest rates. These 
researchers found evidence which indicates that the relationship 
between expected rates of inflation and actual rates of inflation 
was much closer to the 1960's than in the 1950's. They also found 
short-term expectations explaining an increasingly larger portion 
of variations in interest rates. Furthermore, all of these studies
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found that expectations have had a much stronger effect on interest 
rates since 1959.
Turnovsky (1970)
In 1970, S. J. Turnovsky published a study which demonstrated that
a significant break in the formation, rationality, and accuracy of
33businessmen's price expectations occurred in the early 1960's.
The data on price expectations used by Turnovsky were provided ■ 
Joseph A. Livingston who had conducted a survey every six months 
since 1946 asking informed business economists their predictions of 
price changes for the next six months or twelve months. Turnovsky 
then compared these predictions to actual price changes obtained from 
the U. S. Department of Labor publications.
Figures II-5 and II-6 indicate to what extent predictions for the 
next 6 or 12 months follow actual price changes for the past 6 or 12 
months respectively. It is important to note that until the early 
1960's both the short term and longer term predictions move relatively 
independently of immediate past price changes. However, after that 
period predictions move very closely with actual price changes. This 
evidence suggests that the inflation of the late 1950's was largely 
unanticipated, while more recent inflation, at least until 1969, was 
largely expected.
In order to further test whether a break in the formation of 
expectations did occur, Turnovsky estimated the expectations equations 
using ordinary least squares regression for two time periods. Period
33S. J. Turnovsky, "Empirical Evidence on the Formation of Price 
Expectations."
FIGURE II-4
REGRESSION RESULTS USING SEASONALLY ADJUSTED AND UNADJUSTED DATA
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FIGURE II-5
PREDICTED AND IMMEDIATE PAST-ACTUAL PRICE CHANGES, SIX MONTHS
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Source: S. J. Turnovsky, "Empirical Evidence on the Formation of
Price Expectations," Journal of American Statistical Association, 
(December, 1970), p. 1446.
FIGURE II-6
PREDICTED AND IMMEDIATE PAST-ACTUAL PRICE CHANGES, TWELVE MONTHS 







Source: Turnovsky, p. 1446.
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one was from the first half of 1962 to the first half of 1969. Equations 
representing three different theories of how expectations are incorporated 
into interest rate changes were used; these were:
(1) Extrapolative hypothesis. This approach asserts that the 
expected price change for the next six months equals that for the past 
six months with a correction added to allow for the trend in price 
changes over the past six months.
(2) Adaptive expectations hypothesis. This approach asserts that 
the change in expectations equals some portion of the last period's 
forecast error. Both hypotheses are special cases of distributed lags, 
used in so many previous studies of the Fisher effect.
(3) Weighted expectations hypothesis. This approach is specialized 
for adaptive expectations where expected price is a geometrically 
declining weighted average of all past six monthly price changes.
Equations representing all three hypotheses were more successful
in explaining expectations in the later period as evidenced by much
2higher values for R and higher t values for the regressions in the 
latter period (1962-1969) than for the earlier period (1954-1964). 
Turnovsky concluded that while expectations and thus, interest rates 
were biased underestimates of inflationbefore 1960, while from 1960- 
1969, expectations and interest rates have shown no systemmatic 
biases to either under or overpredict. Moreover, whatever the reason, 
and the theories are numerous, the apparent result has been a 
substantial improvement in the accuracy of forecasts.
Gibson (1972)
Very closely related to Turnovsky's study, both in methodology and
results, was an article by William E. Gibson entitled, "Interest Rates
34and Inflationary Expectations: New Evidence." Gibson used the same
survey data gathered by Joseph Livingston, and tested very similar
time periods. Period one was from 1952-1959 and period two was 1959-1970.
Gibson used the survey data to determine expected rates of change 
in prices, and then related the expected rates of change to actual 
market rates of interest. This approach indicated interest rates 
were closely related to expected rates of inflation for various 
maturities from three months to ten years. The correlation was greater 
when data from the second period were used, and as shown in Table II-4, 
expected rates of inflation were more highly correlated to rates of 
interest for both short and longer term maturities in period two.
Because of this evidence, Gibson, like Turnovsky, concluded that either 
the expectations-generating function or the effects of expectations 
on interest rates changed from period one to period two.
Because the difference in coefficients by periods was discovered 
by chance, it could have been possible that the change in the relation­
ship of expected rates of inflation to actual rates might have actually 
taken place sometime other than 1959. It might have appeared to occur 
in 1959 due to this particular segmentation of the data. To check this 
possibility, the estimations in Figures II-6 and II-7 were repeated for 
various time periods. The results of these tests yielded two major 
conclusions. First, these tests further substantiated the hypothesis
34William Gibson, "New Evidence."
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TABLE I1-4
INTEREST RATES AND EXPECTED RATES OF INFLATION
Period. I Period 2
(Observations a t <>-monlh intervals; end of 
June and December, 19 59:12 -1970 :12)
R ate C onstan t fi° , „ f\-  S.F..
it =  6
3-m onlh  hilts 2.20-1" 0 .9 2 My* 0.7.17 0 .7 790
(0 .302 ) (0 .1 1 7 2 )
6-m onth bills 2.359" 0 .9358" 0 .751 0 7578
(0 .2 9 3 ) (0 .1 1 4 0 )
9-12 -m o n th  bills 2.496" 0 .9110" 0 .7 67  0.7061
(0 .2 7 3 ) (0 .1 0 6 2 )
3 -5 -ve ar securities 3.087" 0 .8312" 0 .7 8 4  0 .6 140
(0 .2 3 8 ) (0 .0 9 2 4 )
10-year and longer 3.437" 0 .6012" 0 .7 7 4  0 .4579




1.889" 1.0869" 0 .7 6 7  0 .7 3 3 0  
(0 .3 1 2 ) (0 .1 2 6 9 )
2.045" 1.0957" 0 .7 7 9  0.7141  
(0 .3 0 4 ) (0 .1 2 3 7 )
9-12 -m o n th  bills 2.192" 1.0658" 0 .7 9 4  0 .6 637
(0 .2 8 2 ) (0 .1 1 4 9 )
3 -5 -yc ar securities 2.771" 0 .9903" 0 .8 4 4  0 .5 226
(0 .2 2 2 ) (0 .0 9 0 5 )
10-vear and longer 3.170" 0 .7342" 0 .8 77  0 .3377
bonds (0 .1 4 4 ) (0 .5 8 4 7 )
(Observations at 6 -m onth intervals; end of . 




C onstant h ,* Ri s.i:.
2.25-1" 0 .2587" 0 .2 4 4  0.7736
(0 .2 0 6 ) (0 .1101)
3 5 - \c a r  securities 2.882" 0 .1 7 9 6  0. 133 0.7115
(0 .1 8 9 ) (0 .101 2 )
10-year and longer 3.137" 0 .0 9 1 0  0 .0 7 0  0.4467
bonds (0 .1 1 7 ) (0 .063 5 )
n =  12
3-m onth bills 2.158" 0 .4537" 0 .1 8 0  0.8060
(0 .2 0 8 ) (0 .2 2 4 9 )
3 -5  year securities 2 .8 21“ 0 .4 4 7 9 “ 0 .2 6 3  0.6562
(0 .1 7 0 ) (0 .183 1 )
10-year and longer 3 .1 0 8 ' 0 .2578" 0 .2 2 9  0.4067
bonds (0 .1 0 5 ) (0 .1135)
. ;  __ .. Expected prices from Livingston: observed
consumer price index and interest rates from Federal 
Reserve B u lle tin .
* Denotes significant a t 0.05 level.
; , jjS Expected prices from Livingston; observed 
consumer' price index and interest rates from Federal 
Reserve B u lle tin .
B Denotes significant at 0 .05 level.
Source: William E. £ibson, "Interest Rates and Inflationary Expectations:
New Evidence," American Economic Review (December 1972)
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that an important shift in the relationship between expectations and 
interest rates took place at the very end of the 1950's. This is 
consistent with the findings of Yohe and Karnosky and Turnovsky.
All three studies indicate that expectations have had a stronger 
effect on interest rates since 1959. Gibson also concluded that for 
a time after 1956, interest rates may have actually overadjusted to 
changes in expectations. Like Turnovsky, Gibson presents a number of 
plausible arguments for the structural break that occurred in late 
1959 or early 1960. For this dissertation, it is only important to 
establish the underanticipation of inflation before 1960 and the more 
fully or perhaps overanticipated inflation which followed. The reasons 
why this occurred are not critical to the hypothesis of this dissertation. 
However, as previously explained, the role of expectations is crucial 
to the theory that debtor firms benefit from inflation.
Even though the identical data mentioned by Turnovsky and Gibson 
to approximate expectations do not cover post-1970 periods, it is 
entirely possible that the sharp rise in prices which occurred in the 
1968-74 period may have been unanticipated to some degree. If this 
did occur, the benefits to debtors from acquiring debt prior to the 
change in interest rates which followed could be similar to that 
hypothesized for the 1955-1959 period.
In a recent article entitled "A Study of Price Forecasts", John
A. Carlson offers evidence that the trend towards correctly anticipated
35inflation was reversed after 1967. Carlson's study, like the 
research of Gibson and Turnovsky previously discussed, was based on
35John A. Carlson, "A Study of Price Forecasts," Annals of Economic 
and Social Measurement (1977), pp. 27-55.
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the original responses to the Livingston surveys. His findings, 
illustrated in Figure II-7, update and generally support the 
findings of Gibson and Turnovsky.
Carlson found that over the 29-year horizon of the Livingston 
surveys, unanticipated inflation has usually been positive. In other 
words, forecasts of inflation have typically underestimated the rate 
of increase in the Consumer Price Index. In fact, unanticipated 
inflation was negative (the rate of inflation was overpredicted) on 
only 13 occasions out of the 58 surveys. Furthermore, as Figure II-7 
indicates, inflation surprises are larger when forecasters underpredict 
than when they overpredict. This finding makes the results obtained 
by Hong and others even more puzzling. Here we have once again the 
apparent contradiction between studies showing that debtors did not 
benefit from inflation in periods where inflation was by all published 
results shown to be unanticipated.
For the purpose of analyzing the results conducted in this 
dissertation, it is important to note that Carlson, Gibson, and 
Turnovsky identified essentially the same periods of anticipated and 
unanticipated inflation. These periods include unanticipated inflation 
prior to 1959, especially the 1955-59 period; correctly anticipated 
inflation from 1960-67; and a rise in unanticipated inflation after 
1967. Especially noteworthy was the rapid and unexpected surge in 
prices after 1972, due to the Arab oil embargo, agricultural shortages, 
and possibly the removal of wage-price controls.
53
FIGURE II-7
ACTUAL INFLATION TYPICALLY OUTSTRIPS EXPECTATIONS
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Source: John A. Carlson, "A Study of Price Forecasts," Annals of
Economic and Social Measurement, (June, 1977), pp. 27-55. First 
measurement June 1948, last measurement December 1975.
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In light of the previous research concerning the anticipation 
of inflation, one can expect to find the following results in testing 
the hypothesis that benefits to debtor firms from inflation are inversely 
related to the degree to which inflation is correctly anticipated. 
Initially there should be superior performance in firms which main­
tained a debtor position during the period prior to 1959 when inflation 
was more unanticipated. For the 1960-67 period when inflation forecasts 
were very accurate, no significant difference in the performance of 
debtor versus creditor firms are expected. Finally, as unanticipated 
inflation reappears after 1967, the benefits to debtor firms should 




The purpose of this chapter is to develop tests satisfying two 
requirements. The initial objective will be to test the relationship 
between debtor-creditor position and holding period returns, hereafter 
abbreviated as HPR. These tests will employ rank correlation techniques 
similar to those employed in prior studies to allow the comparison of 
these results using recent data (1960-1973) to the findings of studies 
using earlier data.
Studies conducted using data from the early post-war period
generally found significant negative rank correlation, evidence apparently
supporting the Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis during the early post-war period.^
A second group of studies using data up to 1970 found only weak support
2for the Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis. That is, they generally found 
negative correlation coefficients, but the coefficients were usually not 
statistically significant. The most recent research, utilizing data
^The early studies which found significant correlation between the 
degree of debt and holding period returns on common stock were: Kessel,
"Inflation-Caused Wealth Redistribution," Broussalian, "A Test of the 
Debtor-Creditor Hypothesis," and DeAlessi, "Do Busines Firms Gain From 
Inflation?".
2Among those finding only weak support for the Keynes-Fisher 
Hypothesis were: Bach and Stephenson, "Inflation and the Redistribution
of Wealth," and Bradford, "Inflation and the Value of the Firm."
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from the post-1960 period, found evidence of a positive and significant
3relationship between creditor status and holding period returns.
The second objective of these rank correlation tests will be to 
conduct a comparison of the validity of the Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis 
prior to and following the 1960 structural break in interest rate 
determination. This will be accomplished by testing the data from two 
sub-periods, 1955-59 and 1960-73, then comparing the relationship 
between debtor-creditor status and HPR in the early versus the latter 
period. If inflation was more correctly anticipated in the latter 
period, then the correlation between debtor rank and stock price per­
formance should be weaker than in the prior period. If this did not 
occur, one would expect the results to be similar to those of Kessel 
and other investigators of earlier inflations, and the results from 
the first and second sub-period should be very similar. However, it 
will be shown that a decline in rank correlation significance or even 
an opposite correlation indicating creditors outperformed debtors is 
not enough to fully substantiate the hypothesized decline in the 
importance of the Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis.
SELECTION OF TIME PERIOD TESTED
The 1955 to 1973 time period was selected for a number of reasons. 
Prior to 1955 Compustat data are not available. Also, prior to 1952
3Studies which found evidence contradictory to the Keynes-Fisher 
Hypothesis included: J. Litner, "Inflation and Security Returns,"
Journal of Finance, (May, 1975), pp. 259-280; Bodie, "Common Stocks as 
a Hedge Against Inflation;" and Hong, "Inflation and the Market Value 
of the Firm."
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interest rates were not free to adjust to changes in inflationary 
expectations due to the operations of the United States Treasury and 
the Federal Reserve system. It is also important to note that rising 
expectations of inflation were generally prevalent after 1955. The 
1955-1973 period also included data prior to and following the structural 
break in interest rate determination. Finally, this period ends before 
the recent disruptive influences on expectations which followed the 
removal of wage-price controls and the Arab oil embargo. The effects 
of such disruptions are . discussed more fully later in this dissertation.
THE DATA SAMPLE
The data sample used for this study come from the familiar Investor's 
Management Sciences Compustat data tape, annual industrial edition, 
primary file, dated 1955-1973. Data are available for the largest and 
most Important New York, American, and Regional Exchange companies. For 
most of these companies, data are available for at least ten years, and 
in some cases, data are available for twenty years. The Primary file 
contains approximately 900 companies, primarily industrial corporations 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
Regulated companies such as public utilities and transportation 
companies were excluded. Such regulation could bias stock price perform­
ance, obscuring relationships which might otherwise exist between stock 
price performance and debtor-creditor status. Furthermore, firms in 
industries such as utilities and transportation tend to be very debt 
oriented due to their asset structure and/or extremely stable cash flows. 
The inclusion of such firms would likely result in a heavy industrial 
bias toward debtor status in the sub-sample.
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THE SUB-SAMPLES
From the data sample of approximately 900 companies described in 
the preceding section, two sub-samples were selected. Based upon 
results of previous studies, it was anticipated that these sub-samples 
would contain both debtor and creditor firms in sufficient number to 
conduct a rank correlation test. These sub-samples were not randomly 
selected, but included all firms from the data samples which conformed 
to the selection criteria. The final sub-samples consisted of 283 
firms for the 1955-60 period; 50 of these were debtors and 233 were 
creditors. In the 1960-73 period, 204 firms conformed to the selection 
criteria; 73 were debtors and 131 were creditors.
SELECTION CRITERIA
The five selection criteria were based on the availability of 
complete data necessary to conduct rank correlation tests of the 
relationship between debtor-creditor status and stock price performance. 
Companies with incomplete data in any necessary category were excluded.
All companies were required to have complete yearly data for 
monetary assets and monetary liabilities. This was necessary to 
establish year by year the debtor or creditor position of the firm.
To avoid yearly cyclical inconsistency, all firms selected had all 
fiscal years ending December 31. Each firm selected for the sub-samples 
had total assets listed for each year. This information was necessary 
in order to rank debtors and creditors according to their relative 
rather than absolute debtor or creditor status. Closing stock prices
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and cash dividends were necessary to calculate HPRs, therefore, any 
firm which did not have this data for each year was excluded. The 
data were adjusted to account for the impact of stock dividends and 
stock splits. Companies selected for the sub-samples were also 
required to be consistently debtors or creditors. Any creditor company 
which was a debtor for more than one year or any debtor firm which 
was a creditor for more than one year was excluded from the sub-sample. 
This consistency criterion was applied to each sub-period independently.
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
The variables examined in the following rank correlation tests 
are the average relative debtor-creditor position and the stock price 
performance (measured by HPR).
The debtor or creditor status of each firm was calculated by 
subtracting monetary liabilities from monetary assets. A detailed 
listing of the accounts involved calculation is included in footnote 
number 12 page . Negative numbers indicate debtor firms and positive 
numbers indicate creditor firms. Ranking of this variable was based 
on the average relative importance of the debtor or creditor position 
as calculated below.
MA^ - ML m t_____ t
t^l TAtDC = i--- (III-l)m
where DC = average relative debtor or creditor status
MA = monetary assets 
ML = monetary liabilities
TA = total assets 
tn = number of years in the period tested.
Firms were also ranked according to performance, measured by 
deflated holding period returns (HPR"). This measure was calculated by 
taking the closing price of the common stock for the time period tested 
plus all cash dividends over the period and dividing this total by the 
price at the beginning of the period as in Equation III-2 below.
m
Pe" + E D"
HPR" = ----- ^ ----  (III-2)Po
where HPR'*= deflated holding period returns
Pe" = deflated ending price 
Po" = deflated beginning price 
D" = deflated cash dividends 
m = number of years per period tested.
Due to the different rates of inflation existing within each time 
period tested, all cash dividends and price data were adjusted for 
changes in the level of prices, using the wholesale price index. Stock 
prices and cash dividends were also adjusted for stock splits and 
stock dividends. In assigning performance ranks, the highest HPR" 
was assigned the number one rank, then lower ranks were assigned down 
to the lowest HPR" which was assigned the (nth) rank.
NONPARAMETRIC TESTS
Two rank correlation methods are employed in testing the Compustat 
data previously described. One method is based on rg , the Spearman
coefficient of' rank correlation. The other is based upon the 
coefficient x, or Kendall's "tau".~* Both of these are nonparametric 
techniques involving the ranking of the value of each variable.
Parametric techniques are usually preferable because of their greater 
sensitivity. However, this generalization is not true when the 
underlying assumptions are seriously violated. In fact, under certain 
circumstances (e.g., badly skewed distributions, particularly with 
small n's) a nonparametric test may well be as powerful as its 
parametric counterpart. Applying more than one nonparametric test to 
the data adds credibility to the findings if the results are consistent. 
The term nonparametric is generally used to describe distribution- 
free methods where we make no assumptions about the distributions from 
which we are sampling. However, the values of the test statistics, 
rg and x, derived from these procedures do conform to known distributions. 
To reject the null hypothesis, the test statistic must be sufficiently 
different from zero that the random chance of obtaining such a value 
is very small, .05 or less.
SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION TEST
The first technique employed is the coefficient rank correlation
(r ). In this method, the initial step is to form a pair of ranks s
4For a detailed explanation of the Spearman Rank Correlation 
Test, the reader should consult Lincoln Chao, Statistical Methods and 
Analyses, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), pp. 451-453.
^Kendall's method is also described in Chao, Statistical Methods 
and Analyses, pp. 453-456.
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for each company. Each company in the sample is assigned one rank 
for the average relative debtor-creditor status and one rank based 
on HPR'. The assignment of debtor-creditor ranks was independent 
of the assignment of HPR ranks.
The assignment of debtor-creditor rankings was accomplished by 
calculating the average relative debtor or creditor position using 
Equation III-l. This calculation yields a single figure which may 
be positive, zero, or negative. The firms are then ranked from the 
largest positive number, the number one rank (indicating the greatest 
relative creditor position) down to the largest negative number or the 
nth rank (indicating the greatest relative debtor position). To insure 
that ties were eliminated, the calculations were carried out to four 
decimal places.
Companies were assigned performance ranks based on HPR' as 
calculated in Equation III-2. The ranking was accomplished in a 
manner similar to the debtor-creditor ranking with the firm having the 
highest HPR' assigned the number one rank down to the nth rank 
for the firm with the lowest HPR'.
After each firm is assigned a pair of ranks in the manner just 
described, the sum of the squared differences between each pair of 
ranks is calculated. For example, assume six companies listed in 
alphabetical order (A, B, C, D, E, F) had the following ranks assigned 
for debtor-creditor status (I) and HPR (II).
Companies A B C D E F
(I) D-C Status 2 4 5 3 1 6
(II) HPR 3 2 6 5 4 1
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m
±E = (I)2 + (2)2 + (I)2 + (2)2 + (3)2 + (5)2 - 44
Then we can apply the formula for Spearman's coefficient of rank
correlation to find r as follows:s
n
6 . £ di2
r = 1 --^1---
S n(n2-l)
where di is the difference between ranks of the ith pair and n is the 
number of pairs included.
The significance of the rank correlation coefficient may be 
determined by comparing:
n-2t = r  --- 2~s 1-r  ̂s
with the Student's t distribution with n-2 degrees of freedom.
The hypothesis tested is that the two variables with rank values 
are independent; that is, there is no particular association between 
the ranks of one variable and the ranks of the other. If the rank 
order of one variable agrees with that of the other, there will be 
a positive correlation between the rank orders, while a negative 
coefficient reflects a negative correlation.
KENDALL RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
Using the same type of data for which the Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient is useful, another statistic called the Kendall rank 
correlation coefficient (designated x) can be computed. Kendall's 
x is also a measure of the degree of correlation between two sets of 
ranks.
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The intial step is to obtain a pair of ranks for each firm based 
on the two variables average relative debtor-creditor status (I) and 
holding period returns (II). The. methods used in obtaining these 
rankings are the same methods previously described for the Spearman 
rank correlation coefficient. Suppose five companies (A, B, C, D, 
and E) have been assigned a pair of ranks using Equation III-l and 
Equation III-2, and that the following rankings are obtained:
Companies A B C D E
I. D-C Status 2 3 1 5 4
II. HPR' 3 1 2 4 5
Before x can be calculated, one of the ranks must be in natural 
order. Either variable may be chosen for this procedure but for 
this example, we shall let variable I's rankings be rearranged in the 
natural order; then we have:
Companies C A B E D
I. D-C Status 1 2 3 4 5
II. HPR' 2 3 1 5 4
The next step in computing x is to compare every pair of ranks 
assigned by variable II, given that the rankings of variable I are 
in the natural order. Each comparison yields a score of +1 or -1, 
depending on whether the pair is in natural or reverse order. The 
algebraic sum of all the scores, designated S, is the numerator of 
the coefficient x. In this example, variable II's ranking of the 
five companies A, B, C, D, and E, are respectively, 2, 3, 1, 5, and 4. 
Beginning with the first number 2, we count the number of ranks to
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the right which are greater; there are three such ranks: 3, 5, and
4, <= +3. Then we subtract from 3 the number of ranks to right that 
are smaller; there is only one company (B) for which variable II is 
smaller. Therefore, the end result is +3 - 1 = +2. This operation 
is repeated for each successive number in the II ranking. The net 
result is S =  +2 + 1 + 2 - 1 =  +4 for any number of companies (n). 
The total number of possibe pairs to be compared would be:
n! n(n-l)
\2/ 2! (n-2)! 2
This would also be the maximum possible value for S. Of course, 
this maximum value for S could only be reached if the two sets of 
rankings are in complete agreement. If both ranks are in natural order, 
every pair of variable II*s rankings will receive a +1 score, giving 
" possible pairs. If the two rankings are in perfectly reverse order, 
the value of S would be - since each pair would receive a score of 
-1. The Kendall rank correlation coefficient is the ratio of S to 
the total number of possible pairs; that is,
Sx = n(n-l)/2
When n is larger than 10, x has an approximately normal distribution
2 { 2n “f” 5 }with E(x) = 0, and a standard deviation ox = 9n(n~~-~i) " ^ ie nu^^
hypothesis that no association or correlation exists between debtor- 
creditor rank and holding period returns is tested by computing the 
standardized normal score. By finding the value of Z in a table for 
the standard normal distribution, the degree of significance can be 
determined.
z = T ~ e (t> t
°x [2(2n + 5)]
[9n(n - 1)]
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The values of r and t  may not be the same even though the data s
used In both computations are identical. However, both have the same 
power to detect the existence of correlation between populations. 
Therefore, one would logically expect the results of these two tests 
to be very similar.
Actual application of the formulas mentioned for these two rank 
correlation tests was accomplished using the Statistical Analysis System, 
1976 version, to simplify programming. This system is a programmed 
package which includes the formulas for many statistical tests, among 
them the Spearman and Kendall rank correlation tests. Along with each 
correlation coefficient, the number of observations contributing to 
the correlation coefficient and an approximation of its significance 
probability is given. The significance probability of a correlation 
coefficient is the probability that a value of the correlation 
coefficient as large or larger in absolute value than the one calculated 




Statistics indicating the characteristics of the samples used in 
both rank correlation tests for both time periods can be seen in 
Table III-l. From these statistics, we can see that the mean and 
median values of the average relative debtor-creditor status were
^For a more detailed description of the CORR procedure involved, 
one may consult Barr, Goodnight, Sail, and Helwig, A User's Guide to 
SAS 76 (Raleigh, NC, SAS Institute, Inc., 1976), pp. 92-96.
67
TABLE III-l






I. Samples Size 283 204
II. Monetary Assets - Monetary LiabilitiesTotal Assets
A. Mean .182 .073
B. Median .197 .148
C. Standard Deviation .231 .273
D. Minimum Value -.462 -.548
E. Maximum Value .893 .754
III. Holding Period Return 
(Adjusted For Inflation)
A. Mean 248% 272%
B. Median 253% 169%
C. Standard Deviation 181% 365%
D. Minimum 37% 7%
E. Maximum 2406% 3257%
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positive for the samples used in both periods. The mean value in the 
1955-59 period was ,,182 with a median value of .97. In the 1960-73 
period, the mean value was .073 and the median value was .148. The 
median values were larger positive numbers than the mean values, 
indicating a skewed distribution with the long-tail being on the 
creditor side.
The samples were large, 283 in the first period and 204 in the 
second period. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the population 
distribution of the data sample of approximately 900 firms would 
exhibit similar characteristics to those of these samples. The data 
indicate that large, well-established firms tended to be net monetary 
creditors in both periods.
RANK CORRELATION RESULTS
The results of the Spearman and Kendall rank correlation tests 
are summarized in Table III-2. The results of both tests were consistent 
with one another in both time periods tested. In the first period, 
1955-59, the test statistics for both were positive. For period one, 
the correlation coefficient of the debtor-creditor variable to the 
holding period return variable was .082 for the Spearman correlation 
coefficient and .055 for the Kendall tau method. However, as we can 
see in Table III-2, for both tests these values Indicate approximately 
a 17% probability that random chance could have accounted for a value 
as great or greater than was found.
For the second period, 1960-73, the test statistics were both 





Period 1 Period 2
1955-1959 1960-1973
r ,  1 r  » MA-ML Rank of Average — — —
vs. .082 .300
Holding Period Return
Significance Level .1678 .0001









Significance Level .1708 .0001
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for the Spearman rank correlation and .200 for the Kendall method.
In both cases these values were significant well beyond the 1% level. 
That is, there is less than a 1% probability that random chance could 
account for these results.
Considering the significance of the values yielded in the first 
period, the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the holding 
period yields of debtor and creditor firms cannot be rejected with a 
high degree of confidence. However, we can reject the null hypothesis 
for the second period at the .99+ confidence level and conclude that 
the holding period returns of creditor stocks was greater than the 
holding period returns of debtor stocks during the 1960-73 period.
The most important consideration is that the rank correlation 
results are consistent with the hypothesis of this dissertation. The 
hypothesis indicates that the longer the post-war inflation continued, 
the smaller the unanticipated component of inflation became, therefore, 
weakening the relationship hypothesized by Keynes and Fisher. This 
is consistent with the results because not only did debtor benefits 
decline, but creditors actually outperformed debtors in both periods. 
The evidence strongly indicates that benefits to debtors not only 
declined but became negative in the post-1960 period.
It is tempting to speculate with these results. If the public 
gradually learned to adjust to price increases during the post-war 
period, inflation could have been on balance fully anticipated in the 
1955-59 period. If there was no element of unanticipated inflation, 
one would expect no benefits to debtors. As we have explained, this 
hypothesis cannot be rejected for the 1955-59 period. Furthermore,
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if unanticipated inflation actually became negative during the 1960-73 
period, this fact alone could explain the significant degree to which 
creditor stocks outperformed debtor stocks during this latter period.
Although this explanation neatly fits the hypothesis of this 
dissertation, we should compare this explanation with what would be 
expected in light of previous similar studies and considering the 
results of economic research on unanticipated inflation mentioned in 
Chapter II. Such comparisons point out a number of unanswered questions.
COMPARISONS WITH PREVIOUS STUDIES
In comparing the results of tire Spearman and Kendall rank correlation 
tests to the findings of similar previous studies, we find the results 
of both tests are consistent with previous tests conducted over similar 
time periods. This is true even though other rank correlation tests 
do not generally include data from the 1950's into the 1970's.^ This 
is an important consideration because the varied results of previous 
rank correlation tests have been suspect due to differences in methods 
of rank correlation used, overlapping time periods, different sample 
selection criteria, short time periods, and other inconsistencies.
However, because of the time span involved and the consistency of 
methodology, such reasoning cannot explain the different results found
^Studies conducted using pre-1960 data exclusively found strong 
support for the Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis, among these are Kessel, "Test 
of a Hypothesis" (1956), and DeAlessi, "Do Business Firms Gain From 
Inflation?" (1964). Other studies using data from the 1950's and 1960's 
found only weak support; these include Bach and Stephenson, "Inflation 
and the Redistribution of Wealth," and Bradford, "Inflation and the 
Value of the Firm." Most recently, Bodie, "Common Stocks as a Hedge 
Against Inflation," and Jaffer and Mandelker, "The Fisher Effect," 
found negative relationships between debtor status and stock performance.
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in the 1955-59 versus the 1960-73 period in this dissertation. In 
both periods and for both rank correlation tests, the methods used 
were the same, the time periods did not overlap, and the time spans 
were as long as those used in the pre-1960 studies which found 
significant positive correlation between relative debtor status and 
holding period returns on common stock.
Although the results of the rank correlation tests are consistent 
with other similar studies and the hypothesis of this paper, a close 
examination of the evidence presented in Figures II-2 p. 40, II-4 
p. 46, and II-5 p. 47, raises some questions. First of all, even 
though inflation became more fully anticipated during the 1960’s, 
it does not appear to have been fully anticipated. In most periods 
some element of unanticipated inflation remained. Also, even though 
the evidence indicates that inflation was overanticipated for a brief 
period in 1971 and 1972, this hardly seems sufficient to explain the 
superior creditor performance during the entire 1960-73 period. There­
fore, the role of inflationary anticipation alone does not appear to 
be a wholly satisfactory explanation for the results obtained using 
rank correlation.
In analyzing the results of the rank correlation tests contained 
in this dissertation and similar studies, it is important to recognize 
the limitations of these methods. Rank correlation techniques do not 
control in any way for a number of important factors which may be 
related to debtor-creditor status and are also related to holding 
period returns on common stock. Because of such factors as tax effects, 
inventory effects, industry bias, and financial leverage, a number of
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other plausible explanations must be considered. In analyzing the 
different results in the two time periods tested and when comparing 
early studies with those using more recent data, we shall examine a 
number of phenomena which could explain the results obtained.
One important consideration which could explain the results of
the rank correlation tests in this dissertation and also in early
studies, is the impact of inflation on the value of tax deductions in
the form of depreciation. Any firm which owns assets not fully
depreciated for tax purposes has a positive claim on future money
(in the form of lower taxes). Whether inflation is anticipated or
unanticipated, the value of all such future claims is reduced by inflation.
Depreciation claims are not included as monetary assets, therefore, the
debtor position of all firms with depreciable assets is in reality
overstated. This factor could explain a number of recent studies which
have found significant negative correlation between inflation and
8aggregate stock price performance. Furthermore, if the level of relative 
debtor status is related to the level of depreciable assets, the tax 
effect could also explain why debtor firms have experienced lower 
holding period yields in recent inflationary periods. Even if inflation 
was not fully anticipated, positive debtor effects could have been 
offset or even outweighed by the negative impact the decreased value of 
the positive claim on future money via lower taxes. The existence of
g
The May 1976 Journal of Finance, pp. 447-483, contains three such 
papers by Bodie, "Common Stocks as a Hedge Against Inflation:" Jaffee 
and G. Mandelker, "The Fisher Effect;" and Nelson, "Inflation and Rates 
of Return on Common Stocks." These papers were discussed by Donald 
A. Nichols, "Discussion," pp. 483-487.
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the taxation effect does not explain why the results in period one 
were different from those in period two. However, the interaction 
of both the debtor and taxation effects could explain such a difference.
As the rate of inflation rose after 1960, as illustrated in 
Figure 1-1 p. 2, the taxation effect became more powerful. The 
higher the rate of inflation, the greater the reduction in the value 
of claims on future money via the tax deductibility of fixed depreciation 
charges. Simultaneously, public anticipation of inflation increased, 
and even though the rate of inflation was rising, unanticipated 
inflation fell from 1969 and became negative in 1971 and 1972. There­
fore, rather than becoming more significant, the benefit to debtor 
firms, via decreased value of future cash outflows more than offsetting 
interest rates, fell and actually became negative. During the 1971-72 
period inflation premiums exceeded actual rates of inflation. Thus, 
an increasingly powerful tax effect and the declining importance of 
the Keynes-Fisher effect would be logically consistent with the rank 
correlation results reported in this dissertation and by other 
researchers.
9Donald Nichols, in discussing studies by Bodie, Jaffee and 
Mandellcer, and Nelson, contends that time is a key factor in determining 
the impact of inflation on holding period yields for common stocks.
This argument involves market adjustments which occur the moment a 
new forecast of inflation is made, and long run adjustments which may 
occur much later. The logic of this view is that the value of the 
future money due to tax deductions from depreciation decreases during
^D. Nichols, "Discussion."
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inflation. Therefore, one would expect an instantaneous adjustment 
in stock prices as soon as inflationary expectations increase. Once 
this instantaneous adjustment is made, the price of the stock should 
increase over time to reflect the increasing value of goods to which 
it represents a claim. If inflation proceeds at the higher rate 
forecast, the stocks value should grow in nominal terms at a higher 
rate as well. The longer the time period tested the greater this 
lag effect should be in relation to the instantaneous adjustment.
Studies which have found negative correlation between rates of 
return on common stock and the rate of inflation over short periods 
of time, may have captured the instantaneous adjustment while missing 
most of the long run effects. Also, it should be noted that Nichols' 
analysis assumes a one-shot forecast of higher inflation rates. As 
previously noted in Figure II-2, inflationary expectations grew 
throughout the 1960-73 period tested in this dissertation. Therefore, 
rather than one instantaneous adjustment, the market was subjected to 
continual revisions in inflationary expectations causing continual 
adjustments in common stock prices. Because of the dynamic process 
involved, it may only be possible to capture the long run impact of 
inflation by using a lag structure for holding period returns.
In addition to the effect of time and taxes, there are other 
factors which rank correlation techniques cannot hold constant when 
comparing the holding period returns of the common stocks of debtor 
and creditor firms. One such factor is the possibility of a differential 
wealth transfers due to the impact of inflation on taxes via historical
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inventory accounting."^ The understatement of inventory cost is largest 
for FIFO, smaller for moving average costing, and least when LIFO is 
used. In fact, if the level of inventory increases during the year 
and LIFO is used, an overstatement of inventory costs could result, 
giving the firm a lower tax liability. In general, an understatement 
of inventory costs would be most likely, with the amount of under­
statement being proportional to the rate of inflation. If the methods 
of inventory costing used or the relative importance of inventories 
is in any way related to debtor or creditor status, the rank correlation 
results may be affected.
Rank correlation results may be subject to industrial bias, due 
to the fact that debtor-creditor status is very consistent within 
industries. In most industries firms are all debtors or all creditors 
with few industries having both debtor and creditor firms. This can 
logically be related to such factors as the nature of the assets 
being financed, the variability of cash flows, and the degrees of 
operating leverage. If debtor and creditor firms are from different 
industries, this could bias the results of rank correlation tests for 
many reasons. For example, different industries are subject to 
different degrees of business risk. Also, the sales of some industries 
are very sensitive to the general level of economic activity, some are 
relatively insensitive, and a few are even counter cyclical. Because 
of these biases mentioned and others which may be less obvious, it is 
very possible that the results of any rank correlation tests including
"^Hai Hong, "Inflation and the Market Value of the Firm," p. 1032.
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those conducted in this paper reflect the combined effects of numerous 
factors other than the debtor-creditor status of the firm.
The rank correlation results in this dissertation, though 
consistent with other earlier similar studies, are not consistent 
with research dealing with unanticipated inflation. In fact, none 
of the studies conducted thus far have found evidence of a debtor 
effect which is generally consistent with measurements of the magnitude 
of unanticipated inflation. Most recent studies, those including 
post-1970 data, have found no evidence that the stocks of debtor firms 
have holding period yields superior to those for stocks of creditor 
firms. Quite the opposite, most of these recent studies have found 
that creditor stocks outperformed debtor stocks, even in periods
11where economic studies indicate that unanticipated inflation existed.
It is likely that this result is due to the fact that the main 
effect of inflation on corporations since 1960 is a wealth transfer 
from business to government. This effect is brought about through a 
tax system where depreciation charges remain fixed while replacement 
cost rise. Therefore, depreciation is understated and profits are 
overstated, causing firms to pay larger amounts in taxes. This 
effect cannot be separated from the debt effect using rank correlation, 
therefore, the more powerful effect dominates the results.
The limitations of rank correlation techniques does not explain
12the results of the regression study by Hai Hong. Hong examined the
11Bodie, "Common Stocks as a Hedge Against Inflation"; Jaffee, "The 
Fisher Effect"; and Nelson, "Inflation and Rates of Return on Common 
Stocks."
12Hai Hong, "Inflation and the Market Value of the Firm."
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impact of risk, inventory, and taxation effects apart from the impact 
of the debtor-creditor status of the firm. Hong's intent was to 
measure the impact of each of these factors through the use of a 
multiple regression. The results of Hong's regression tests are 
summarized in Table III-3. The first line for each period contains 
the regression results for each variable tested. In all three periods 
the debt variable was insignificant, indicating no evidence of a 
wealth transfer from creditors to debtors.
An apparent contradiction exists between the results of Hong's 
research and economic studies which found evidence of unanticipated 
inflation during the 1954-58 period. As with the rank correlation 
results, a number of factors could explain this contradiction.
One factor which may cause the absence of debtor benefit in 
Hong's study is the use of short time periods and no allowance for a 
lag between debt acquisition and debtor benefit, measured in terms 
of holding period returns. His results are based on a cross-sectional 
regression of mean monthly returns regressed on risk and wealth 
transfer variables. Longer time periods or a lag between debtor- 
creditor calculations and the calculating of holding period returns 
may enable one to capture debtor benefits not apparent in shorter 
time periods.
A second factor which could cause one to doubt Hong's results is 
the nature of correlation between the explanatory variables in his 
regression equation. As we can see in Table III-4, intercorrelation 
exists between the plant (depreciation) and inventory variables and 
between debtor status and plant. More important than this slight
TABLE III-3
C r o s s - S e c i  i o n a l  R e g r e s s i o n  o f  M e a n  M o n t h l y  R e i u r n s  o n  R i s k  a n d  W i a i . i i i  T k a n s i  i r
V a r a m u .es
( T, =  n  +  Uq / (  +  o | A t( -F a2-V2, (1}3 i i )
Const. Sys. Risk Debt . Plant Inv.
Period n "o C1, "2 r 2
1 .0083 .0068 .0006 -  .014.1 -  x x m 0.7.1
(2.75) (3.18)* (0.18) ( - 3 . 8 6 ) * ( - 1 . 5 7 ) ”
(1964-68)
.0165 .0055 - .0 1 9 4 -  .0079 0.59
(8.71) (1 .61 ) '° ( - 4 . 8 0 ) * ( - 1 . 0 4 )
p - 0.033
- .0 0 1 1 .0106 -  .0067 0.52
( - 0 . 5 0 ) (4.51)* ( -  2.03)-
2 .0087 - .0 0 4 3 -  .0027 - .0 0 7 7 -  .0074 0.31
(2.00) ( - 1 1 8 ) ( -  0.66) ( - 2 . 3 2 ) * ( - 1 . 7 1 ) ”
(1959-63)
.00.19 - .0 0 4 7 -  .0061 -  .0077 0.28
(2.64) ( -  t .69)* * ( - 2 . 0 0 ) ’ ( -  1.76)”
p - 0 .0 1 2
.0023 - .0 0 1 5 -  .0063 0.17
(0.68) ( - 0 . 4 4 ) ( - 2 . 1 0 ) -
3 .0140 .0047 - .0 0 0 7 - .0 1 2 2 - .0 0 3 5 0.44
(5.83) (2.54)* ( - 0 . 1 9 ) ( - 3 . 1 4 ) - ( - 0 . 6 3 )
(1954-58)
.0180 .0014 - . 0 1 0 6 -- .0042 0.25
(9.02) (0.34) ( - 2 . 4 4 ) ' ( -  0.66)
p =  0.016
.0103 .0035 - .0 0 4 2 0.13
(4.68) (1.59)* * ( -  1-02)
Notes'.
1. Figures in parentheses arc /-values.
2. ( * )  indicates significant at the 5% level on a one-tail /-lest. ( ” ) at 10%.
Source: Hai Hong, "Inflation and the Market Value of the Firm
Theory and Tests," p. 1042.
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TABLE III-4
C o r r e l a t i o n  M a t r i c e s  a n d  M e a n  S a m p l e  V a l u e s  o f  E x p l a n a t o r y  V a r i a r i  es
Correlation Matrix Mean 5 ample Values
Period ft •V, 'Xi Xi Mean Sid. Dev.
1964-68 ft 1 1.006 0.213
-v. 0.294 1 0.098 0.146
•V, - 0 . 3 7 0 0.39! 1 0.385 0.146
•Vj 0.379 0.017 -0 .5 3 2 1 0.080 0 071
1959-63 ft 1 1.021 0.139
0.468 1 0.067 0.158
Xi - 0 . 1 9 6 0.398 1 0.393 0.159
«v, 0.196 -0 .0 5 4 -0 .4 3 5 1 0.107 0.103
1954-58 ft 1 1.029 0 265
Xx 0.294 1 0.073 0.137
x2 0.283 0.333 1 0.389 0.141
Xi - 0 .1 2 1 0.009 -0 .4 1 0 t 0.095 0.091
Source: Hai Hong, "Inflation and the Market Value of the
Firm: Theory and Tests," p. 1043.
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multicolllenarity, the correlation matrix exhibits a puzzling mixture 
of signs. The explanatory variables are positively correlated in 
some periods and negatively correlated in others. Hong admits he 
can only speculate what the instability of these relationships indicates.
A third problem with Hong's approach is statistical and related 
to his controlling risk by forming portfolios. By so doing, he 
reduces the number of observations for his regression to 24 portfolios. 
Since he uses four explanatory variables, this procedure reduces the 
validity of the R2 and could induce a bias resulting in regression 
results which appear more significant.
Finally Hong's tests must be based on the assumptions of all 
regression analysis: for the results to be valid, the data must
generally conform to the characteristics of a normal distribution.
No tests for normality were mentioned. Without knowing the nature 
of the underlying distributions, the validity of the results is 
open to question.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The findings of the rank correlation techniques presented in this 
Chapter and similar tests reported in other studies tends to support 
the hypothesis of declining debtor benefits as unanticipated inflation 
declines. However, neither this dissertation or previous studies 
found evidence indicating that debtor benefits reappeared as unanticipated 
inflation returned in the late 1960's. Considering this contradiction 
and the shortcomings of rank methods used in this Chapter and by 
other researchers, rank correlation results cannot be consJl"&ered
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conclusive evidence of declining debtor benefits. Also, considering 
the complications associated with Hong's regression study and the 
apparent conflict of his results with research on unanticipated 
inflation, that approach does not appear entirely satisfactory.
Two questions naturally arise out of the conflicting evidence 
and methodology problems just mentioned. (1) What other method 
could be used in an attempt to determine whether the validity of the 
Keynes-Fisher Hypothesis did, in fact, diminish as inflation became 
more fully anticipated? (2) Did this Hypotheses regain its validity 
with the reappearance of unanticipated inflation? An attempt will be 
made to answer these questions in the following chapter. In Chapter 
IV, we will explain the development and results of a series of tests 
designed to isolate and test the significance of debtor benefits 
from unanticipated inflation.
CHAPTER IV
THE EFFECT OF DEBTOR-CREDITOR STATUS ON SECURITY RETURNS
In this chapter a series of tests are developed to isolate and
measure the significance of debtor-creditor status on holding period
1yields on the common stocks of the corporations selected. Unlike 
other recent tests, the intent of these tests is to examine only the 
effect of debtor-creditor status on holding period yields (HPY). The 
tests used in this chapter are designed for the purpose of avoiding 
ambiguities associated with rank correlation results and the complications 
associated with multiple regression techniques.
The portfolio tests in this chapter are based on the formation 
of separate portfolios of debtor and of creditor firms which have been 
made as identical as possible, except for debtor-creditor status. 
Therefore, any statistically significant difference in holding period 
yields between these portfolios of stocks can be attributed to differences 
in debtor-creditor status.
The validity of any conclusions based on these tests will depend 
primarily upon the degree to which ceteris paribus conditions can be 
established and maintained. Realizing this, every effort was made to
^It should be noted that holding period yield (HPY = HPR - 1), is 
the performance measure used in this chapter while holding period returns 
was the measure of performance used in Chapter III. Also, HPR in Chapter 




control those factors through which inflation affects holding period 
yields as identified by previous researchers. In attempting to create 
portfolios as nearly identical as possible, these elements were 
considered in order of the magnitude of their impact on holding period 
yields.
Several factors affecting HPY's during inflation were business 
risk, percentage of fixed assets, accounting treatment, method of 
inventory costing, and the cyclical or seasonal nature of cash flows. 
Because of the intraindustry consistency of these factors, the number 
one priority in controlling for influences other than debtor-creditor 
status was to construct portfolios with identical industry compositions. 
Financial risk was also deemed to be an important determinant of HPY 
and was controlled by matching debt ratios as closely as possible.
Less predictable influences on HPY, such as acquisitions, mergers, 
strikes, etc., were controlled for by eliminating "outlier" firms.
These factors along with the methods of controlling for their influences 
on HPY are described in detail later in this chapter.
If our findings are consistent with the findings of economic 
research on unanticipated inflation previously discussed in Chapter II, 
it is expected that debtor portfolios will be found to generate 
significantly higher holding period yields only if the debtor position 
was established and/or maintained during the period with high unantic­
ipated inflation. It is expected that portfolios of firms exhibiting 
debtor positions when unanticipated inflation was approximately zero 
will derive little or no benefit from their debtor positions. As outlined 
in Chapter II, the period 1955-74 can be divided into three major
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2subperiods: a high degree of unanticipated inflation from 1955-59,
correctly anticipated inflation from 1960-66, and the reappearance 
of unanticipated inflation beginning about 1968.
Therefore, we expect our tests to show firms which held debtor 
positions during the 1955-59 period generating significantly higher 
HPY's compared to firms which were debtors during that period. As 
inflation became almost totally anticipated from the end of 1959-1967, 
such debtor benefits should decline and perhaps disappear. Finally, 
with the reappearance of unanticipated inflation after 1967, significant 
debtor benefits should reappear. The absence of such findings would 
indicate that either, contrary to accepted theory, there is no benefit 
to debtors even when inflation is unanticipated or ceteris paribus 
conditions were not established.
SELECTION OF TIME PERIOD
The time period selected was 1954-1976. It was desired to consider 
a time period which included both subperiods used in the rank correlation 
tests. Using comparable periods aids in making comparisons between the 
two sets of results. The reader should note, however, that because of 
a five lag structure used in this chapter, it was not possible to obtain 
results for debtor-creditor positions after 1972.
2The graphs summarize the finds of S. J. Turnovsky, "Determination 
of Price Expectations," and J. A. Carlson, "A Study of Price Forecasts."
Both of these studies deal with the measurement of unanticipated 
inflation and generally agree on the time periods during which unanticipated 
inflation existed.
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As in Chapter III, it will be especially interesting to compare 
results for the period prior to 1960 to those following I960. Such 
comparisons are important since empirical evidence indicates a change 
in the nature of the expectations generating process occurring about 
I960.3
SELECTION CRITERIA
The general sample from which the portfolios were constructed 
is again based on the Compustat Primary Industrial File, dated 1954-76. 
Using this sample, a portfolio of debtor firms and a portfolio of creditor 
firms for each year under consideration was formed.
Initially some firms were eliminated by computer screening due to 
incomplete data. If complete data were lacking in any year for the initial 
five year period used to establish debtor-creditor status, or the follow­
ing five year span used to calculate holding period yield, the company 
was screened out by the computer. Companies with inconsistent fiscal 
years were eliminated in the same manner. After the computer screening, 
the remaining criteria were applied through inspection of the computer 
printouts. This was a rather painstaking and time-consuming method, but 
one which was necessary to insure that the portfolios of debtor and 
creditor firms were as accurately matched as possible.
3Reseachers presenting such evidence include: William E. Gibson,
"Interest Rates and Inflationary Expectations: New Evidence," K. Lahiri,
"Inflationary Expectations: Their Formation and Interest Rate Effects,"
and S. J. Turnovsky, "Empirical Evidence on the Formation of Price 
Expectations.
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The general sample was screened to insure availability of all 
necessary data. In order to classify firms according to relative 
debtor-creditor position, monetary assets minus monetary liabilities 
divided by total assets was needed for each five year interval from 
1954-71. Since a lag structure is employed, the holding period yield 
for the subsequent five year period for each firm was necessary for the 
period 1958-1976. For example, if the firms were ranked according to 
debtor-creditor status for the period 1966-70, the holding period yield 
was calculated for the period 1971-75. It was also necessary to be 
able to calculate the debt ratio, total debt divided by total assets, 
during the same years in which the debtor-creditor status was established. 
As in Chapter III, all firms selected were required to have all fiscal 
years ending December 31. This was done in order to avoid seasonal 
or cyclical inconsistencies in HPY's or debtor-creditor classification. 
Any company with incomplete data in any of these areas in any year was 
excluded from -.the samples involving that five year span. Exclusion 
in one five year moving interval, however, would not exclude the company 
from being included in other periods where data were available.
PORTFOLIO FORMATION PROCEDURE
The selection criteria were established with the intent of forming 
portfolios as nearly identical as possible in every respect except 
debtor-creditor status. Given that all necessary data were available, 
the initial step was to find industries within which both debtor and 
creditor firms existed. To identify industries, four-digit Compustat 
codes were used. Compustat classifies companies into industries using 
the U.S. Department of Commerce's Standard Industry Classification
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(SIC) codes. For a firm to be selected, at least one debtor and one 
creditor firm must have been listed under the identical four-digit 
SIC code.
Identical industry composition was the number one portfolio 
selection criterion for a number of reasons. Within industries 
there is likely to be general consistency in accounting methods. 
Therefore, it is expected that pairs of companies chosen from the same 
industry will use similar methods of depreciation. Even more important, 
one can assume very similar asset composition. In particular, the 
percentage of depreciable assets will be quite consistent. The 
selection of pairs of companies from identical industries was the
t)
method chosen to equalize the inflationary impact of depreciation (via 
tax effects) between the debtor and creditor protfolios being examined.
Equalization of inventory effects due to inflation is also 
considered in the pairings by industry. Companies in the same industry 
producing similar products, in addition to having similar relative 
amounts of fixed assets, are likely to use the same types and relative 
amounts of inventories. Also, due to the similarity in accounting 
procedures, the methods used for costing inventories would generally 
be consistent within industries. Therefore, identical industry pairings 
equalize the impact of inflation due to the relative size of inventories 
and the methods of costing inventories.
Another factor associated with industry which, if uncontrolled, 
might cause differences in holding period returns, is business risk. 
Business risk is generally defined as the risk inherent in the assets,
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that is, the variability of cash flows due to the nature of the assets 
employed and the product produced and sold. This factor is also 
controlled by industry pairings. Logically,firms using similar assets 
to produce a similar product will experience the same seasonal, 
cyclical, and secular trends in cash flows.
The inflationary effects associated with depreciation (via tax 
effects), inventory, and business risk, have all been identified in 
previous studies as factors through which inflation affects HPY's. 
Therefore, the highest priority was given to the requirement of identical 
industry composition for all portfolios tested. Additionally, other 
consistencies, perhaps less important and less apparent, also exist 
within industries and are controlled by this procedure.
The second step in forming portfolios required that firms be 
classified as either debtors or creditors on the basis of monetary 
assets minus monetary liabilities. For a firm to be classified as a 
debtor or a creditor for any five year span, it must have maintained 
a debtor or creditor status for at least three of the five years.
In addition, companies classified as debtors or creditors must have 
maintained an average debtor or creditor position over the five year 
period. If more than one pairing was possible within an industry, the 
firms with the largest relative debtor or creditor position were 
chosen. If the firms were approximately equal in the relative 
significance of their debtor or creditor positions, the firm which 
was a debtor or creditor for the largest number of years during the 
period was chosen. Therefore, most of the firms selected were not
90
only debtors or creditors on the average, but were also firms which 
maintained that position each year.
These criteria used to establish debtor and creditor firms are
more thorough than the methods used in previous studies. Prior studies
often classified companies as debtors or creditors based only upon
4their status at the beginning of the period being tested. Other 
researchers classified companies according to their average status 
over the period being tested.^ Either of these methods can lead to 
unreliable results due to two important reasons. First, many companies 
switch frequently from debtor to creditor position or vice versa.
Therefore, using one year's status to classify firms does nothing to 
insure they maintain their original status. Second, in terms of the 
impact of inflation, many firms are essentially neutral, even though 
they may have a slight average debtor or creditor position. Such 
firms will bias the results because their monetary assets are approximately 
equal to monetary liabilities. For these reasons a criterion was 
chosen which considered both the relative size of the average debtor 
or creditor position and also the consistency in maintaining that 
position.
The third step in the formation of portfolios involved the ratio 
of total debt to total assets. One might expect that those companies
^R. Kessel, "Inflation Caused Wealth Redistribution."
~*H. Hong, "Inflation and the Market Value of the Firm."
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with more monetary liabilities than monetary assets may exhibit superior 
HPY's due to the greater risk acceptance of their management. To 
minimize the effect of differences in financial risk, companies were 
also matched by their overall debt ratios. The debt ratio is a more 
complete indicator of a firm's risk profile than only considering 
its monetary assets versus monetary liabilities. Often several firms 
which met the debtor-creditor criterion existed within an industry.
In such cases the pair or pairs of firms with the most nearly identical 
debt/total assets ratio was chosen. The objective was to establish 
portfolios of debtor and creditor firms with statistically significant 
debtor-creditor status while the portfolios were required to have debt 
ratios which were not statistically different. The test used and 
results are described elsewhere in this chapter.
This procedure may appear repetitious due to the fact that all 
companies were previously classified and matched according to debtor- 
creditor status within industries. However, the definition of debtor 
and creditor firms used in this dissertation cannot be equated to the 
measurement of leverage via debt ratios. In many cases, firms main­
taining a debtor status according to the monetary assets minus monetary 
liabilities measure of inflationary impact, actually had lower debt 
ratios than creditor firms in the same industry. Therefore, one 
should not confuse or equate the debtor position of monetary liabilities 
exceeding monetary assets to a position of high financial risk as 
measured by the total debt ratio.
One criterion which could take precedence over the others mentioned 
involved the possibility of "outlier" firms. These would be defined
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as firms, which due to some factor which could not be controlled by 
other criteria, could bias the results of the tests because of unusually 
high or low holding period yields. Any company with extreme values 
(+3.0 standard deviations from the industry average in any five year 
period) was considered an outlier. Such unusual variance could be 
caused by merger activity, acquisition attempts, tender offers, anti­
trust suits, or other activities which could affect holding period 
yields apart from the impact of inflation. Therefore, such companies 
were excluded from consideration for selection in any period.
As a result of screening for incomplete data, eliminating 
"outlier" firms, and the selection procedures relating to identical 
industry pairings and similar debt ratios, the great majority of firms 
were eliminated. However, in forming portfolios, the size of the final 
samples was not deemed as important as the accuracy of the pairings.
The sample size could have been expanded, but only at the expense 
of some sacrifice in ceteris paribus conditions— conditions essential 
to the logic of the method. Consequently, the largest protfolio 
contained thirteen securities and the smallest only seven.
TESTS OF PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE
The statistical method chosen for testing the performance of 
portfolios of debtor versus creditor firms was dictated by the nature of 
the data being tested. The method chosen had to be a statistical test 
which yielded results based on small samples. This was essential 
because none of the pairs of portfolios constructed contained more than 
13 firms. Due to the selection process, larger samples were unattainable.
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Furthermore, it was necessary to select a test applicable to dependent 
samples,^ because the selection of each debtor or creditor firm was 
dependent upon the existence of a firm with the opposite debtor-creditor 
status in the same industry. Since the firms are paired, the two 
portfolios for each year are of equal size, so the selection of a test 
requiring identical sample size presented no problem.
The method finally selected was the t-test for small dependent 
samples. While statistical inference about the mean of a single 
population on the basis of a small sample is an important application 
of the t-distribution, the purpose of these tests was to make 
inferences about the difference between the means of two populations.
When making inferences about the differences between two means, 
one of two separate assumptions are possible. One assumption is that 
the two population variances are different. Under this assumption, 
the computation of the number of degrees of freedom is quite involved. 
Such involved calculations can be avoided if one can apply the normal 
approximation; however, this requires large samples.^ However, in our 
tests it is unnecessary to test the population variance because we 
are hypothesising that any differences in portfolio performance are 
due to random error. Under this assumption, the computation of the 
number of degrees of freedom is a simple process (n-1). We can then
^Audrey Haber and Richard Runyon, General Statistics, (Reading, 
Mass., 1969), p. 212-218.
^Lincoln L. Chao, Statistics: Methods and Analyses, (New York,
McGraw-Hill, 1969), p. 259.
apply the t distribution, and small samples present no special problem. 
Due to the fact that our portfolios were all small, dependent samples, 
the latter assumption was made.
The tests statistics were derived in the following manner. Given
two portfolios, each of size n,
Portfolio 1: X n s Xi2» • • • > X
Portfolio 2: X21, X22, . . . , X ,
the expected difference between their respective means is equal to the
difference between the means of populations from which the samples
are taken. That is,
E(D) = E(Xi - X2) = yj - y2 .
Because of the pairing of debtor and creditor firms, the standard error
of the difference is expressed as
a-2 = E(XX - x2 - Vi + P2)2
= E[Xj - Pi) - (X2 - P2)]2
= E[(X]. -Pi)2 + E(X2 - P2)2 “ 2E(Xx -Pi)(Xi - p 2)
+ O!2 + a22 - 2E(Xj - pi)(X2 ~ P2)*
This last term consists of two units of the covariance of Xj and X2 
which is not 0 .,
However, we need only consider the matched samples as a single 
sample of D's; that is,
Di = X u  - x 21, d 2 = x 12 - x22, . . . , Dn = x ln - x 2n.
Thus we obtain the mean differences
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E(D - D )2
n-1
We now compute
D - E(5) 
t ~ S /V
(IV-2)
which has a t-distribution with n-1 degrees of freedom. The confidence 
interval for E(D) is estimated just as for a single mean with X and
E(D) can be tested in the usual way by applying equation 4-2 with n-1 
degrees of freedom.
Due to the fact that we are primarily concerned with differences 
in performance of holding period yields over time, required significance 
levels will not be specified. Rather, the results will be reported and 
analyzed without such references. It is expected that the degree of 
significance should be higher the greater the degree of unanticipated 
inflation.
Using the portfolios in Table IV-1 as an example, the steps in 
testing the differences in holding period yield were as follows.
Step 1: Calculate the sum of the differences in HPY.
S//n~ replaced by D and S //n~, respectively. Then, any hypothesis about
9
.E, D. = 1.92 x=l l
Step 2: Calculate the average difference.
TABLE IV-1
HOLDING PERIOD YIELDS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR PORTFOLIOS
Debtor-Creditor Status 1966-1970 
Holding Period Yields 1971-1975
HPY_ - HPY_ D C
Debtor Name % HPY Industry No. Creditor Name % HPY D.
Mohasco Corp. - .29 2510 Kroehler Mgf. Co. - .46 .17
McGraw-Hill Inc. - .16 2731 Grolier Inc. - .83 .67
Diamond Shamrock 1.63 2800 Koppers Co. 1.52 .11
Squibb Corp. .04 2830 (G.D.) Searle & Co. .00 .04
Sun Chemical Corp. - .25 2890 Inmont Corp. - .14 - .11
Atlantic Richfield .54 2911 British Petrol. Co. Ltd. .23 .31
Union Oil of California .38 2911 Royal Dutch Petrol. Co. .19 .19
Flintkote Co. - .23 2950 National Gypsum Co. - .31 .08




Step 3: Calculate the standard error of the mean difference.
(.17-.21)2+( .67-.21)2+(.ll-.21)2+(.04-.21)2+(-.11-.21)2+g2 _ £(D±-D)2
D n - 1
(.31-.21)2+(,19-.21)2+( .08-.21)2+ ( .46-.21)2
9 - 1
"/r ’ 5 -23
S2"2 n 23 = .077
D /IT /9"
Step A: Calculate the value of t.
t = — ■ = 2 73.077
D
With eight degrees of freedom, this value is significant at the .05 level, 
The procedure detailed in this example was duplicated for each 
of the 14 pairs of portfolios selected over the 1954-1971 period for 
five year holding period yields calculated from 1959-1976. The results 
of these tests are summarized in Table IV-2, and the entire group of 
portfolios, provided in Appendix A to this chapter, are analyzed in 
the next section.
The t-test was also used to determine if a significant difference 
existed between the debt ratios of debtor firms versus creditor firms.
If differences in financial risk existed, observing superior holding 

















1954-58 1959-63 .51 .287 1.78 6 .15
1955-59 1960-64 .64 .33 1.94 6 .05
1956-60 1961-65 1.15 .50 2.25 6 .04
1957-61 1962-66 .20 .10 2.0 6 .05
1958-62 1963-67 .29 .20 1.45 7 .10
1959-63 1964-68 .37 .30 1.23 7 .14
1960-64 1965-69 .04 .22 .173 8 0
1961-65 1966-70 - .054 .19 .28 6 0
1962-66 1967-71 .018 .17 .12 9 0
1963-67 1968-72 .05 .14 .36 7 0
1964-68 1969-73 - .097 .11 .9 9 .10
1965-69 1970-74 - .14 .23 .62 9 .26
1966-70 1971-75 .21 .08 2.73 8 .05
1967-71 1972-76 .24 .18 1.33 12 .10
CO
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than debtor-creditor status. This test revealed that even in those 
periods where debtors significantly outperformed creditors, no significant 
differences existed in the debt ratios of debtor and creditor firms. 
Appendix B illustrates this test procedure for the 1966-70 period.
For this particular period, the debtor holding period returns were 
greater than those for creditors at the .05 level of significance.
ANALYSIS OF PORTFOLIO TESTS
In examining the results of the portfolio tests summarized in 
Table I.V-2, we find the results of these tests consistent with our 
expectations based upon the results of economic research into the 
changing nature of inflationary anticipations in the post-war period.
As illustrated earlier in Figures II-4, II-5, and II-6, a 
relationship between anticipated rates of inflation and actual rates
g
of inflation has been documented by a number of researchers. In 
general, these findings indicate that expectations adapted slowly to 
the existence of continuing inflation in the post-war period. By 
1959, however, anticipations had adjusted; from 1959 to 1967, estimated 
rates of inflation very closely approximated actual rates of inflation. 
This relationship deteriorated after 1967 and was destroyed following 
the removal of wage and price controls in 1972 and the so-called 
shortage inflation caused by the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74.
If the research concerning unanticipated inflation accurately 
reflects the conditions which existed, one would expect firms which
g
Two such studies, which together, span most of the period under 
consideration are: S. J. Turnovsky, "Formation of Price Expectations,"
and J. A. Carlson, "A Study of Price Forecasts."
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established or maintained a debtor position prior to 1959 and following 
1967 to have holding period yields superior to those of firms which 
maintained creditor positions during those periods. Furthermore, one 
would not expect to find a significant difference in the performance 
of firms which held debtor or creditor positions during the intervening 
1960-67 period of correctly anticipated inflation.
Upon examination of the results summarized in Table IV-2, we find 
that as hypothesized, the portfolios of firms which maintained a 
debtor position in the pre-1959 period do show significantly superior 
holding period yields compared to the portfolios of firms which 
maintained creditor positions during that period. However, we see this 
relationship weakening in the 1958-62 and 1959-63 periods and 
disappearing entirely after the structural break of 1960. As hypothesized, 
the portfolio tests indicate that no significant difference existed 
between the performance of portfolios of firms which maintained debtor 
or creditor positions from the 1960-64 period through the .1963-67 
period. During this period of correctly anticipated inflation, the 
differences in the performances of debtor and creditor portfolios were 
not statistically signifianct at any level. Then as expected, with the 
reappearance of unanticipated inflation debtor portfolios once again 
outperformed creditor portfolios.
The only periods where creditors outperformed debtors, at any 
significance level, were the 1964-68 and 1965-69 periods. These 
results are not significant at high levels, .85 and .74 respectively. 
However, when considered in the context of the rising demand for 
debt capital and increasing uncertainty during these periods, these
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findings are not surprising. There was a major movement of corporations 
into the debt market during the post-1965 period. The impact of this 
trend will be examined in the next chapter.
One additional finding which should be noted is the difference 
in significance levels in the pre-1960 period when compared to the 
post-1967 period. Why, when unanticipated inflation reappeared at 
levels comparable to pre-1960 levels, didn't the superior performance 
of debtor firms reemerge just as before? This may also be related to 
the rapid increase in the demand for debt capital. However, an 
even more likely cause was the growing uncertainty associated with 
inflationary forecasts, particularly after 1970. This trend will also 
be analyzed in Chapter V.
CHAPTER V
IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT TRENDS
As we mentioned at the conclusion of Chapter IV, the extremely 
rapid increases in the actual rate of inflation which occurred after 
1967, particularly the double-digit inflation of 1973-74, brought about 
a resurgence of unanticipated inflation. According to the hypothesis 
of this dissertation, one would expect this rise in unanticipated 
inflation to bring about an equally strong reoccurence of superior 
debtor performance. However, even though the degree of unanticipated 
inflation which reappeared was even larger than that which existed in 
the 1955-59 period, portfolios of firms maintaining a debtor position 
during the latter period did not outperform creditor firms as signifi­
cantly as in the earlier period, as shown in Table IV-2.
In this chapter we shall examine recent changes in the degree of 
uncertainty associated with forecasts of inflation, and changes in 
recent trends in the overall debt positions of corporations. These 
factors will be examined in order to point out possible explanations of 
the portfolio results reported in Chapter IV. An analysis of these 
trends will provide insight into the probable impact of unanticipated 
inflation on debtor and creditor firms.
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CHANGES IN THE UNCERTAINTY OF EXPECTATIONS
The crucial role of expectations has been mentioned frequently 
in this dissertation. Most businessmen would agree that many decisions 
depend on expectations, and often forecasting accuracy determines the 
difference between success and failure. Despite the fact that the 
importance of expectations has long been realized, only recently have 
economists and financial experts begun to bring inflationary expectations 
into the mainstream of their analysis of economic behavior."*'
The emergence of anticipation as a key concern is largely due to the 
increasingly important- role inflation premiums have played in interest 
rate determination, particularly since 1960. Researchers have come to 
realize that by understanding the expectations generating process relating 
to inflation, they are likely to discover the factors which determine
actual inflation. This view has been responsible for a great deal of
' 2the research into interest rate determination reviewed in Chapter II.
Two key questions in this area are: how much uncertainty surrounds
the inflationary outlook, and how does the" existence of uncertainty 
effect interest rates'?" Until 1972, these questions had been largely
^Donald J. Mullineaux, "Inflation Expectations in the U.S.: A
Brief Anatomy," Business R.eview Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 
(July-August, 1977), pp. 3-12.
2A number of studies dealing with the role of price expectations in 
interest rate determination were reviewed in Chapter II. These included: 
William Gibson, "Interest Rates and Inflationary Expectations," S. J. 
Turnovsky, "Empirical Evidence on Price Expectations," Yohe and Karnosky, 
"Interest Rates and Price Level Changes," and Kajal Lahiri, "Inflation­
ary Expectations: Their Formation and Interest Rate Effects."
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ignored, partially because of the cost of gathering data on expectations 
and partially because of the difficulty of quantifying anticipations.
The existence of uncertainty about the future rate of inflation may be 
the most costly aspect of our current bout with inflation and the 
most difficult aspect to control. This factor is a growing concern 
among policymakers attempting to control inflation, economists trying 
to predict inflation, and businessmen learning to cope with inflation.
The most pronounced and unanticipated inflationary surges in the
post-war period occurred with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950,
and the so-called "shortage inflation" of 1973-74. Due to the fact
that this study does not consider pre-1952 data, only the latter episode
will be analyzed. There is little doubt that the double-digit inflation
of 1974 and 1975 caught many forecasters by surprise. After years of
reliable estimates, their forecasting tools had started to lead them 
3astray. As a result of these forecasting failures, businessmen and 
policymakers were required to adjust to rapidly rising prices on very 
short notice. Of course, a large part of these forecasting failures 
can be attributed to a sequence of unforseeable events. The oil embargo, 
the removal of wage-price controls, and agricultural shortages all 
added to inflationary pressures and all of these factors were difficult 
to predict. Nonetheless, there was a general loss of confidence in 
economic forecasts. Due to the lack of accuracy in recent forecasts, 
businessmen, policymakers, and the general public are more uncertain
3Nariman Behravesh, "Forecasting Inflation: Does The Method Make
a Difference?," Business Review Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 
(September-October, 1976), pp. 9-17.
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about the accuracy of Inflation forecasts. This increase in uncertainty 
has important implications for interest rates and, thus, the benefit 
derived by debtor firms during unanticipated inflation.
It would be illogical to expect interest rates to be the same 
regardless of the degree of uncertainty associated with forecasts of 
inflation. For example, if people are; certain that next year's inflation 
rate will be 6 percent, we would expect a 6 percent inflation premium 
will be added to the pure rate of interest. Therefore, on a riskless 
securityj if the pure rate of interest is 4 percent, with the added 
inflation premium the rate of interest will become 10 percent. However, 
a different result would be expected if the expectation is for 6 percent 
inflation, but the public believes that any rate between 0 and 12 percent 
is possible. The added element of uncertainty becomes a factor.
In this example, holders of fixed return securities suffer a capital 
loss on fixed return securities if inflation is underestimated, causing 
interest rates to rise more than was expected. Therefore, a rational 
lender would demand more than just the 4 percent risk-free rate plus 
the expected rate of inflation of 6 percent. This is particularly 
likely if lenders realize that the probability of the actual rate of 
inflation being below the expected rate is less than the probability 
of the actual rate exceeding the expected rate.
As was shown in Figure II-6, historical evidence indicates that 
actual rates of inflation generally exceed predicted rates. Furthermore, 
when large forecasting errors are made, they are usually due to an under­
estimate of the actual rates. Rarely have predicted rates of inflation 
fallen short of actual rates. Lenders will take these past tendencies 
into consideration in determining required rates of return.
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Even though an additional element of risk due to uncertainty in
inflationary forecasts appears to be a logical hypothesis, it is a
rather recent hypothesis. Despite the evidence that inflation has
generally been underestimated in the post-war period, some confusion
still exists about whether or not this implies irrational lender
behavior. This lack of unanimity can be attributed to the tendency
to assume that expectations are rational, and therefore, unbiased
estimates. A careful examination of the literature reveals that, in
general, researchers have found that rational expectations are not
synonymous with unbiased or on average accurate expectations.
Hai Hong expressed the opinion that, "we should not be surprised
to find that the average effect of expectations in various periods is
4to wash out net debtor gains or losses due to inflation." Hong believes
that if expectations are rational, in the sense that forecasts incorporate
all available information,^ the net effect over the long run should be
zero. If one assumes that forecasts consider only the past history
of inflation, the assumption that people make rational inflation fore-
£
casts is easy to test using the Livingston Survey data. These data 
have also been tested using more complex models; namely, the extrapolative,
4H. Hong, "Inflation and the Market Value of the Firm," p. 1035.
5This view of the rationality of expectations has gained widespread 
acceptance due to research conducted by J. F. Muth, "Rational Expectations 
and the Theory of Price Movements," Econometrica, (July, .1961), pp. 315- 
355.
^For a discussion of some simple tests, see Donald J. Mullineaux, 
"More on the Rationality of the Livingston Price Expectation Data," 
Research Paper No. 26, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, (June, 1977).
107
adaptive, and weighted expectations models. Tests using the naive 
model and more complex models have generally confirmed the rationality
g
of Livingston's survey data. Since these surveys sample the opinions
of well-informed business, economic, and financial experts, it is
reasonable to assume these surveys closely approximate the anticipations
of the market as a whole. However, evidence offered by a number of
researchers indicates that since World War II, forecasters have
9usually underpredicted the rate of inflation. Therefore, rationality 
does not necessarily guarantee accuracy.
Turnovsky and Mullineaux found evidence which indicates that errors 
in forecasting do not reflect the misuse of information or lack of 
rationality. The tendency of forecasters to underestimate inflation 
merely reflects the fact that the most important factor considered 
in forecasting models is the recent past period's inflation. When we
S. J. Turnovsky tested the rationality of Livingston's surveys 
using more complex structural models. For a discussion of these tests 
see "Empirical Evidence on the Formation of Price Expectations."
g
For a different opinion on the rationality of the Livingston 
surveys, one may consult James Pesando, "A Note on the Rationality of 
Livingston Price Expectations," Journal of Political Economy, (August, 
1975), pp. 849-858. Pesando compared the Livingston survey data with 
forecasts using a distributed lag model and concluded the survey 
forecasts were not "rational" expectations. However, a distributed lag 
model is a mechanical forecasting technique, and therefore, incapable 
of including all relevant available data. For a description and 
comparison of tests for rationality in expectations, the reader is 
referred to Marcelle Arak, "Rational Price Expectations: A Survey of
Evidence and Implications," Research Paper No. 7716, Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, (March, 1977).
9Researchers presenting evidence of actual inflation exceeding 
expected inflation include: S. J. Turnovsky, "Empirical Evidence on
the Formation of Price Expectations," John A. Carlson, "A Study of 
Price Forecasts," and William E. Gibson, "Interest Rates and Inflationary 
Expectations."
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consider the inflation history of the U.S. (see Figure 1-1), it is 
not surprising that these errors have not been quickly eliminated.
While the existence of unanticipated inflation is crucial to the 
hypothesis that debtors benefit from inflation, it is also important 
to realize that the variance in the accuracy of inflation forecasts is 
also an important issue. Such changes in uncertainty have been detected 
and measured using Livingston's survey data, and the results of these 
measurements are quite relevant to the results obtained in the previous 
chapter.
MEASUREMENTS OF EXPECTATIONS UNCERTAINTY
It is possible to measure the degree of uncertainty associated 
with inflation forecasts by calculating the standard deviation of the 
probability distribution that describes the forecasts of inflation 
surveys. Using the data from the Livingston surveys, Donald Mullineaux 
calculated such measures of inflationary uncertainty over time.^
These calculations were based on the expected rate of inflation fore­
casts eight months in advance. Figure IV-1 summarizes the results of 
Mullineaux's calculations. The findings indicate that there was a 
great deal of uncertainty about the future path of prices after World 
War II. Some forecasters were predicting depressions, some recessions, 
and others inflation. Thus, the high standard deviations in inflation 
forecasts after the war were caused by opposing predictions. We can 
also observe the decline in uncertainty, reflected by lower standard
^Donald Mullineaux, "Inflation Expectations In The U.S.A."
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FIGURE V-l
INFLATION UNCERTAINTY HAS BEEN ON THE RISE
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deviations, as forecasters adjusted to continuing inflation. By the 
1960's forecasters were in agreement to such a degree, that the 
standard deviation of inflation forecasts had fallen to one-half 
of one percent. During this period almost all forecasters expected 
inflation, and furthermore, the differences in rates of predicted 
inflation were minor.
The rising uncertainty about inflation which began after 1966 
and accelerated rapidly in the early 1970's was unlike the situation 
which existed after World War II when forecasters predicted both 
rising and declining prices. By 1967, few if any forecasters expected 
falling or even stable prices. The post-1966 increase in inflation 
uncertainty was almost totally due to the fact that there was growing 
disagreement about how rapidly prices would rise.
As we can observe in Figure V-l, the degree of uncertainty about 
the future rate of inflation rose rapidly beginning in 1973. Mullineaux's 
findings indicate that, on average, inflationary uncertainty from late 
1973 to 1975 more than tripled relative to the level of uncertainty 
which existed in the I960's. Since rational investors demand higher 
returns as compensation for increased risk, interest rates began to 
reflect not only expected inflation, but also the uncertainty of that 
expectation.
THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY ON INTEREST RATES
Edward Shaw has suggested that the rise of "dirty inflation"
(i.e., unanticipated inflation) helped distort relative financial
Ill
prices in recent years. He hypothesizes that the inability to 
predict recent inflation rates generates expectations of future errors 
in inflation forecasts. This uncertainty means short term securities 
provide a margin of safety over long term securities since long term 
securities are more price-volatile than short term. In the eyes of 
investors, long term securities become more risky, and dealings in 
them take place in a distinctive "risk habitat."
12In two separate studies, Joseph Bisignano and Rose McElhattan 
found evidence which supports Shaw's hypothesis. Bisignano, following 
the definition developed by Irving Fisher, calculated the anticipated 
portion of price inflation by subtracting an estimate of the real rate 
of interest from the nominal (market) rate of interest. He subtracted 
Standard and Poor's composite dividend yield (an estimate of the real 
rate) from S & P's high grade bond yield (an estimate of the nominal 
rate). Then he obtained an estimate of unanticipated inflation by 
subtracting this estimated anticipated rate of inflation from the 
observed inflation rate calculated from the Consumer Price Index.
Table V-l provides Bisignano's estimates of unanticipated inflation 
for the 1960-75 period.
As we can see from this table, the corporate Aaa risk premium 
increased from 35 basis points between 1960 and 1964 when unanticipated
11Edward S. Shaw, "Inflation, Finance and Capital Markets,"
Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, (December,
1975), pp. 5-13.
12Joseph Bisignano, "Inflation and the Efficiency of Capital 
Markets," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
(Summer, 1976), pp. 17-23; and Rose McElhattan, "The Term Structure 
of Interest Rates and Inflationary Uncertainty," Economic Review,
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, (December, 1975), pp. 27-35.
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inflation was only .06 percent, to 154 basis points between 1970 and 
1975 when unanticipated inflation grew to over two percent annually.
TABLE V-l
Aaa CORPORATE RISK PREMIUM 
AND UNANTICIPATED INFLATION
1960 —  1975
Aaa corporato- 
Long-term U.S. Gov't. Unanticipated
Period Bond Spread Inflation
(basis points) (annual




Source: Joseph Bisignano, "Inflation and the Efficiency of Capital
Markets," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
(Summer, 1976), p. 23.
Figure V-2 shows that the Aaa corporate risk premium over long-term 
U.S. Governments remained quite stable during the early 1960’s but then 
rose rapidly as unanticipated inflation began to increase after 1965.
The spread even continued to expand when unanticipated inflation fell 
below zero between 1970 and 1972. It appears that risk premiums 
responded to this decline from the third quarter of 1973 to the fourth 
quarter of 1974, but then began rising rapidly again reflecting the 
11 percent increase in unanticipated inflation which began in 1972.
This pattern suggests that unanticipated inflation has become an important 
determinant in the premium demanded by the holders of private debt
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instruments, and that interest rates respond to changes in unanticipated 
inflation after a short lag.
FIGURE V-2
UNANTICIPATED INFLATION AND Aaa CORPORATE RISK PREMIUM
P o rc o n l p f lf  a n n u m  B o a ie  p o in ts
A s a  c o rp o ra te  r i i h  p re m iu m  






U n a n tic ip a te d  in f la t io n
2
1970 1975
Source: Joseph Bisignano, "Inflation and the Efficiency of Capital
Markets," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 
(Summer, 1976), p. 22.
Rose McElhattan presented an analysis of the "Preferred Habitat" 
model of term structure theory which also supports the hypothesis 
that unanticipated inflation has become an increasingly important 
component or risk premiums. She demonstrated that this term structure 
model can be significantly improved by adding inflationary uncertainty. 
In fact, she found that although uncertainty was a factor in determining 
risk premiums in the 1955-65 period, inflation uncertainty was the 
only statistically significant determinant of risk premiums in the
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1966-71 period. Also, the risk differential between Aaa and U.S. 
Governments increased to a much greater degree than the risk premium of 
Baa corporate securities compared to the Aaa yield. This rise in the 
risk structure of interest rates seems to reflect the perceived greater 
risk of corporate securities generally, rather than the greater riskiness 
of less-than-premium rated corporate securities.
Many theories in finance and economics are based upon the assumption
that investors are rational and it is generally assumed that a rational
investor will demand higher returns when uncertainty increases. Exactly
how much this distaste for uncertainty effects interest rates can only
be approximated. Although the exact tradeoff between risk and returns
demanded by lenders is not known, it is logical to assume that such a
tradeoff does exist. Therefore, a less certain inflationary outlook
should produce higher long term interest rates as well as greater
13variability in all interest rates regardless of maturity.
In light of the evidence that uncertainty has affected interest 
rates to a greater degree in the post-1965 period, it is not surprising 
that the findings reported in Chapter IV are somewhat different after 
1965. As was previously mentioned, when unanticipated inflation reappeared 
in the post-1966 period, debtor benefits did not reappear with the degree 
of statistical significance noted for portfolios of firms xjhich 
established debtor positions prior to 1960. At first, glance this seems 
puzzling since the degree of unanticipated inflation in the latter period
13For a discussion of empirical evidence which supports these 
contentions see Eugene Fama, "Inflation and Expected Returns on Treasury 
Bills," Journal of Political Economy, (June, 1976), pp. 427-448.
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was as great as that in the 1955-59 period. However, when we consider 
the increased uncertainty associated with inflation forecasts in the 
latter period, this result seems logical.
It is entirely possible that firms maintaining or moving into 
debtor positions after 1966, not only paid an inflationary premium 
based on the anticipated rate of inflation, but also paid an additional 
premium due to the uncertainty associated with such anticipations.
This uncertainty, as evidenced by the high standard deviations in 
inflation forecasts, was the result of the apparent inability of 
forecasters to accurately predict recent changes in the rate of 
inflation. If such uncertainty was incorporated into higher interest 
rates, this would explainwhy portfolios of debtor firms realized less 
benefit from the unanticipated inflation in the late. 1960's and 1970's.
THE POST-1965 DEBT MOVEMENT
Even though there is evidence to indicate that rising uncertainty 
affected interest rates, this may not be the entire explanation for the 
decline in the degree of statistical significance associated with the 
performance of debtor versus creditor portfolios. Another factor 
may have been the rapid increase in the degree of debt capital used 
by corporations. This post-1965 debt movement has been documented,^4 
but little has been written about the impact of this trend on the 
benefits derived by debtors during inflation. We know that corporate
14 Survey of Current Business, "Public and Private Debt, 1965-1975," 
(August, 1976), pp. 2-3.
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treasurers began to alter the debt/equity ratio of their portfolios 
in the mid-1960's (Figure V-3). It is important that we examine the 
changes in interest rates and monetary assets minus monetary liabilities, 
in order to evaluate the likely inflationary impact of this trend.
The reader should remember that in this discussion, as throughout 
this paper, the terms debtor or creditor refers to the inflationary 
impact due to the difference between monetary assets and monetary 
liabilities, not the degree of leverage (debt capital) employed in 
the capital structure.
FIGURE V-3
CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS
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Source: Herbert Runyon, "Equity Shared and the Financial Markets,"
Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, (Summer, 1976), 
p. 27.
Most studies of the post-1965 debt movement have been related to 
capital structure theory. It may be argued that firms make adjustments
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in their capital structures in response to past market trends. Specifically, 
the post-1965 debt movement may have been an adjustment of firms' capital 
structures in response to observed benefits of leverage. In the 
words of Herbert Runyon, "The experience of the 1957-65 period illus­
trated in vivid detail the advantages of debt financing to increase 
the leverage of the corporate capital structure
The purpose of increasing the degree of financial leverage is 
to increase the relative return to common stockholders. We can observe 
in Figure V-2 that corporations followed a relatively conservative 
capital financing program from the mid-1950's through the mid-1960's. 
However, after 1965 and until 1970, firms began to increase the degree 
of debt in their capital structures. For a while corporations were 
sucessful in widening the spread between the return on equity and the 
return on assets.^ This trend was in tune with the mood of the Sixties, 
when performance was emphasized while risk was de-emphasized and the 
bottom line took precedence.
In the 1970's, manufacturing corporations, like other firms, faced 
a more difficult situation. The combined effects of inflation and 
increased uncertainty led to higher interest rates and increasing 
effective tax rates. Highly levered firms became exposed to both 
higher market interest rates and cyclical fluctuations in earnings.
"^Herbert Runyon, "Equity Shares and the Financial Markets,"
Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, (Summer, 1976), 
pp. 25-33.
16Herbert Runyon, "Equity Shares" offers evidence of the initial 
favorable effects of leverage (p. 27).
118
These changes emphasized to corporate treasurers the negative aspects 
of leverage, as the earlier period had emphasized the positive aspects.
Inflationary benefits to firms in a debtor position (measured 
by monetary assets minus monetary liabilities) may also be related to 
these trends. As we noted (Figure V-2), from 1957-65 there was little 
change in the capital structure of manufacturing corporations. Then 
from 1966-1970 debt ratios rose steadily. From 1970-75 capital 
structures again stabilized. This pattern strongly suggests that 
corporations desired the capital structures that existed in the 1957-65 
and 1971-75 periods of stability. It has also been hypothesized that 
the post-1965 debt movement was an intentional adjustment, due to the 
benefits of leverage which as previously mentioned, became apparent 
during the 1957-65 period. That is, after firms with higher degrees 
of leverage demonstrated superior relative returns to equity, the 
benefits of leverage became widely recognized and the post-1965 debt 
movement ensued. Firms do make adjustments based on observations of 
superior performance, and certainly such intraindustry comparisons do 
occur. Therefore, firms are likely to make adjustments of debtor- 
creditor positions in response to debtor benefits due to inflation, 
evidenced by superior holding period yields for other firms in the 
industry.
If the evidence presented in Chapter IV is correct, debtor firms 
demonstrated superior holding period yields when compared to their most 
identical competitors within the same industry. Therefore, even though 
monetary assets minus monetary liabilities are not necessarily related 
to debt ratios (see Appendix B; Chapter TV), we would expect 1 inns to
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increase their relative monetary debtor position in a manner similar to 
the post-1965 debt movement. Therefore, we would expect the percentage 
of debtor firms to increase relative to the percentage of creditor 
firms following the 1958-1966 period of superior debtor performance.
If such a movement did occur, it would tend to offer support for the 
findings in Chapter IV and, as we shall see, offer an additional 
explanation of declining debtor benefits.
In order to determine if this hypothesized adjustment in debtor- 
creditor status actually occurred, a cumulative frequency distribution 
of net monetary debtor firms was calculated using the same sample 
described in detail in Chapters III and IV. These data are summarized 
in Table V-2 and Figure V-4.
FIGURE V-4
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In Table IV-2 it was observed that firms which established debtor 
postions in the periods beginning 1954-58 and ending 1959-63 began 
to demonstrate superior holding period yields by the 1959-63 period.
In three successive five year periods, 1960-64, 1961-65, and 1962-66, 
the portfolios of debtor firms generated holding period yields which 
were superior to those of the creditor portfolios at a .05 or better
level of significance. Table V-2 shows that during Period I, 1955-65,
the percentage of debtor firms (firms with monetary liabilities in 
excess of monetary assets) was relatively stable, varying from a high 
of 57.4% to a low of 39.7%. In all but those two years, the variation 
from the average of 48.5% was less than 3%.
In 1965 (Figure V-4), the percentage of debtor firms began to 
increase. This trend continued until 1970 when the percentage reached 
72.1%. After 1969 the percentage of debtor firms remained relatively 
stable, varying from 72.1% to 69.1%. The findings are very similar to 
the results reported by Runyon.
In Runyon's study superior relative returns to equity on levered
firms preceded a general debt movement. The superior returns occurred
from 1957 to 1965. A readjustment of corporate capital structures 
followed from 1965-1970, followed by a period of stability in capital 
structures. In our examination of debtor-creditor status and 
inflationary impact, debtor corporations demonstrated superior holding 
period yields from 1954-1958, with the degree of statistical significance 
declining after 1966. During 1966, overlapping the period of superior 
performance by debtors, the percentage of debtor firms began to rise.
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It is interesting to note that the readjustment in debtor-creditor 
status occurred during the period in which debtor benefits from 
inflation disappeared.
Also,it appears that debtor benefits reappeared at approximately 
the same time this readjustment process was completed. The percentage 
of debtor firms increased until .1970, then remained relatively stable.
The HPY's of debtor firms again became superior to the HPY's of creditor 
firms beginning in the 1971-75 period and continuing through the 1972-76 
period. As we can see, the adjustment in debtor-creditor status appears 
to have been subject to the same type of recognition lag as the leverage 
adjustment.
INTERPRETATION OF TRENDS
There are a number of implications which arise from the similarity 
of these two sets of data. First of all, an examination of the data 
presented in this chapter and by other researchers provides support 
for the hypothesis that firms respond to observed stock price performance 
differentials. The post-1965 increase in the degree of leverage in 
corporate capital structures followed a period in which leveraged 
firms demonstrated superior relative returns on equity. The decline 
in monetary assets minus monetary liabilities, reflected by the growing 
percentage of debtor firms, followed a period in which debtor firms 
demonstrated inflationary benefits in the form of superior holding 
period yields.
It is important to note that the adjustment of debtor-creditor 
status follows the periods of superior HPY's for debtor firms, as
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identified in Chapter IV. This evidence supports the use of a lagged 
performance measure such as the one used in that chapter. Firms acted 
as if a difference in market performance did exist related to debtor 
status, at least in the earlier period, and adjusted their financial 
structures accordingly. This observation is consistent with the findings 
reported in Chapter IV, at least for the early period of superior 
debtor performance.
] 7A second consideration is the hypothesis of papers by Shaw 
18and Bisignano , that unanticipated inflation caused the capital markets 
to operate inefficiently in evaluating risk differentials between Aaa
bonds and long-term governments. When one considers the research of
19 20Fama and Mullineaux , an alternative hypothesis seems more likely.
Fama's and Mullineaux’s findings indicated that the nature of risk
premiums was altered after 1967 due to the increasing degree of
uncertainty. Two elements of this rising uncertainty were the error
in inflation forecasts, and the growing uncertainty regarding the
influence of high rates of inflation on corporate performance. The
uncertainty surrounding the rate of inflation caused all interest
rates to be higher, while the general uncertainty about corporate
performance increased the spread between government and corporate
17Shaw, "Inflation, Finance and Capital Markets.”
18Bisignano, "Inflation and the Efficiency of Capital Markets."
19 Fama, "Inflation and Expected Returns on Treasury Bills."
20Mullineaux, "Inflation Expectations in the U.S.A."
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securities. Both of these effects are consistent with the results of 
the tests in Chapter IV.
Increased uncertainty and higher interest rates would decrease 
debtor benefits relative to the degree of unanticipated inflation.
Adding a premium greater than the expected rate of inflation to interest 
rates due to the high standard deviations of inflation forecasts would 
have the same effect as anticipating higher rates of inflation.
Given any actual rate that occurred, the effective unanticipated 
differential would be smaller, and thus debtor benefits less. The 
same effect would be caused by increasing corporate interest rates 
due to uncertainty about corporate rates of return during inflation. 
Therefore, either of these factors or a combination of the two, could 
explain the decline of statistically significant difference in debtor- 
creditor performance in the post-1968 period. It is unfortunate that 
the test results reported here can not include the post-1971 period. 
Because holding period yields were lagged five years, such results are 
impossible to obtain at this time.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Academicians and businessmen have become increasingly concerned 
with the impact of inflation on the business firm as a result of the 
recent periods of rapidly rising prices. One area receiving consider 
able attention in the literature has been the comparative performance 
of debtor versus creditor corporations during inflationary periods. 
Three groups of studies have examined this question, all yielding 
different results. This dissertation has shown that due to the 
changing nature of inflation and its impact on interest rates, these 
differences should be expected.
One cause of these differences has been the variation in the 
level of unanticipated inflation over time. Each of these groups of 
studies use observations from different time periods with different 
inflationary experiences. If benefits to net monetary debtors always 
disappear with complete (accurate) anticipation of inflation, then 
the varying degrees of unanticipated inflation over time would be 
sufficient to explain the different results yielded by the various 
studies. It was shown, however, that this relationship did not alway 
hold for previous research. Some studies failed to detect debtor 
benefits and others found evidence that creditors outperformed debtor 
oven during periods of unanticipated inflation.
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Three possible reasons for these unexpected results were considered. 
First, most of these studies used some form of rank correlation 
procedure to determine if a relationship existed between debtor- 
creditor status and holding period returns. However, these tests did 
not control other factors which could influence holding period returns 
during inflation. Furthermore, such factors as inventory and 
depreciation effects (via taxes) reduce earnings and thereby holding 
period returns regardless of the degree to which inflation was anticipated. 
The results of rank correlation tests, therefore, measure the inflationary 
impact of several factors. The separate influence of debtor-creditor 
status cannot be determined.
Second, previous research has tended to assume that debtor benefits 
are instantly measurable. In these previous studies, differences in 
holding period returns were examined over the same period in which 
debtor-creditor status was measured. Presumably, interest rates 
reflect anticipated inflation; therefore, any debtor benefits from 
inflation result from unanticipated inflation, inflation beyond the 
level forecasted. The market makes instantaneous adjustments when 
inflation forecasts change because inventory, risk, and depreciation 
effects have the same impact on firms regardless of the correctness of 
anticipations. However, debtor benefits due to unanticipated inflation 
are recognized after the fact. Only after the actual rate of inflation 
has been established is it possible to know if previous rates of 
interest included a large enough inflation premium. Consequently, any 
attempt to measure debtor benefits should use a lagged measure of 
holding period returns. Since none of the previous studies incorporated
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such lagged measurements, it is likely that they were strongly 
influenced by inflationary effects other than debtor-creditor status.
A third reason which could explain the inconsistency of some 
previous studies in detecting debtor benefits is differences in 
methodology, data, and time periods tested. In this dissertation 
rank correlation techniques were used over two different periods of 
inflation, 1955-1959 and 1960-1973. These tests suggested that the 
conflicting results in earlier studies were primarily due to differences 
in the time periods involved. These tests showed that the importance 
of different data and different statistical tests, previously mentioned 
as possible explanations for the different results of prior studies, 
was much less than had been claimed.
The tests in Chapter III demonstrated the inability of rank 
correlation techniques to detect debtor benefits in periods when 
unanticipated inflation existed. Even though evidence indicates 
that inflation was generally unanticipated prior to 1960, these 
rank correlation test indicated that creditor firms outperformed 
debtors in both time periods. In the second period, 1960-1973, this 
difference was statistically significant at the .01 level. The 
superior creditor performance indicates that after 1960 while inflation 
was largely anticipated, factors such as depreciation, inventory, 
and risk became more important in determining holding period returns 
and debtor benefits became less significant. These results point 
out the need for a different approach in order to isolate debtor 
benefits.
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In Chapter IV tests were conducted to isolate the effect of debtor- 
creditor status. This was accomplished by establishing ceteris paribus 
conditions for portfolios of firms. Firms which were similar in all 
major respects except debtor-creditor status were paired to form one 
portfolio each of debtor and creditor firms. These tests indicated 
that when other factors influencing holding period yields were controlled, 
the common stock of firms which established debtor positions during 
periods of unanticipated inflation experienced superior performance 
during the following period.
This dissertation is the first research effort finding evidence of 
debtor benefits consistent with accepted economic theory with respect 
to unanticipated inflation. Debtor benefits were detected in the pre- 
1960 period when a high degree of unanticipated inflation existed; 
no debtor benefits were found in the 1960-1967 period of correctly 
anticipated inflation; and debtor benefits reappeared after 1967 as 
unanticipated inflation re-emerged.
The results indicate that the previous inability to detect debtor 
benefits was probably due to two factors: the lack of control over
other factors which influence holding period yields during periods of 
inflation, and the necessity of recognizing that debtor benefits, unlike 
other influences, can only be recognized after the existence of 
unanticipated inflation is recognized. To detect the influence of 
debtor-creditor status, it is necessary to measure holding period 
yields some time after debtor-creditor status is determined.
In Chapter V recent trends in the degree of uncertainty surrounding 
anticipated rates of inflation and the post-1965 debt movement were
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discussed. These trends add support to the findings reported in 
Chapter IV. Evidence was presented indicating that the increasing 
use of debt capital after 1965 followed a period of superior returns 
on equity for more highly levered firms. Therefore, a similar pattern 
was expected to emerge when comparing ''superior" debtor HPY's and the 
percentage of debtor firms following this period of demonstrated 
superiority. As expected, the percentage of debtor firms increased 
greatly following periods when debtor firms exhibited superior 
returns on equity.
In the test conducted in Chapter IV, debtor firms outperformed 
creditor firms in the period beginning 1954-1964; following these periods, 
from 1965-1970, the percentage of debtor firms increased. Firms acted 
in a manner consistent with what would be expected, given the results 
reported in Chapter IV. The fact that firms acted as if debtor firms 
benefited from the unanticipated inflation prior to 1960 lends 
support to the results obtained in Chapter IV. Also, the fact that 
this adjustment did not begin until 1965 tends to confirm the lagged 
nature of debtor benefits, in contrast to the instantaneous nature of 
the adjustments due to other inflationary influences such as depreciation 
and inventory effects.
What conclusions can be drawn considering the evidence presented 
in this study? One important conclusion can be reached by comparing 
the results obtained in Chapter III versus the very different results 
reported in Chapter IV. In Chapter IV when factors other than debtor- 
creditor status were controlled, the results indicated significantly 
superior holding period yields for debtors following periods of
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unanticipated inflation. In Chapter III rank correlation tests indicate 
no significant relationship in the first period, and significant creditor 
benefits in the second period. This leads us to believe that other 
factors such as inventory and depreciation effects decreased the HPY's 
of debtor firms more than the debtor position of such firms increased 
the HPY's at least in the short run.
A second conclusion which may be drawn by the evidence presented 
in Chapter IV is that debtor benefits do exist in periods of unanticipated 
inflation but when inflation is anticipated, no significant difference 
exists between the HPY's of debtor and creditor firms. The ability to 
detect this effect by controlling other influences was a major difference 
between this dissertation and other studies which found no debtor 
benefits over similar periods.
Finally, we have presented evidence that recent trends lend support 
to the results of the tests identifying debtor benefits. The post- 
1965 debt movement was interpreted as a response to superior performance 
by more highly levered firms; therefore, the adjustment of monetary 
assets and monetary liabilities can be viewed as an adjustment in response 
to superior HPY's of debtor firms in preceding periods. Also, rising 
uncertainty surrounding inflationary forecasts was interpreted as an 
additional element of risk adding to interest rates. As such, the 
effect is similar to more fully anticipated inflation in that debtor 
benefits are less due to the risk premium for forecast error.
Assuming that the conclusions mentioned above are valid, what then 
are the implications of these findings for future research, investors, 
and policy decisions by corporate officers? Before attempting to answer
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these questions, certain limitations should be noted. The conclusions 
of this study are applicable only to large, listed, nonregulated 
corporations. Moreover, these conclusions are based on tests conducted 
over the 1952-1973 period. The unique nature of this period must be 
remembered; the evolution of economic factors which occurred during 
this period may not be repeated in the future. Whether or not the 
conclusions of this dissertation are applicable for different time 
periods and for other types of firms can only be determined by additional 
empirical testing.
From the investor's viewpoint the downward adjustment of stock 
prices which ceteris paribus accompanies forecasts of higher inflation 
rates should be regarded as a market adjustment based on effects other 
than debtor status. If the anticipated rate of inflation is expected 
to continue below the actual rate, as it generally has in the past, 
investors should seek out undervalued debtor firms during such periods 
of adjustment in anticipation of debtor benefits which will follow. 
However, if interest rates contain an inflation uncertainty premium, 
debtor benefits will be less significant. Debtor benefits might 
disappear entirely if the degree of uncertainty was great enough.
Corporate officers might use the knowledge, of these short run 
and long run adjustments to benefit their firms. For example, in 
timing security issues the firm should avoid the sale of common stock 
during a short run adjustment caused by forecast of higher inflation 
rates. If inflation is not fully anticipated, these short run adjustments 
will be followed by debtor benefits. Knowledge of the interaction of 
debtor, inventory effects, depreciation effects and risk could also
132
prove valuable in timing dividend payments, making investments, and 
other decisions.
This study has isolated and identified debtor benefits from 
unanticipated inflation. Even though such benefits have existed in 
the past, we cannot be sure they will exist in the future. Inflation 
may become fully anticipated as it was during much of the 1960's.
Also, interest rates may rise more than the expected increase in 
inflation due to uncertainty about the rate of inflation, causing 
the effect of unanticipated inflation to be diminished. The impact 
of anticipations, by definition, can only be evaluated in retrospect. 
However, continuing research in this area should increase the ability 
of corporate officers to include anticipations in policy decisions.
Future research should address other data samples over various 
time periods, perhaps employing other techniques to re-examine the 
conclusions of this dissertation. As the data becomes available, 
the results of the 1972-1977 period can be examined. Considering the 
volatile nature of the period, those results should be quite revealing. 
Still unanswered are questions of whether unanticipated inflation has 
been eliminated since 1974; whether debtor benefits have declined or 
been eliminated due to the uncertainty of anticipations; and if the 
frequency of debtors has risen, declined, or remained constant since 
1973. In answering these questions, researchers should gain valuable 
insight into the formation of expectations as well as their likely 
impact on business firms during periods of inflation.
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APPENDIX A
PORTFOLIOS #1
Companies Holding Debtor or Creditor 








Interstate Brands .14 2051 American Bakeries Co. - .31 .45
Celanese Corp. 1.76 2801 American Cyanamid Co. .32 1.44
W. R. Grace & Co. 1.73 2801 Rohm & Haas Co. .20 1.53
Aerio, Inc. - .16 2803 Koppers C o . .19 - .35
Atlantic Richfield Co. .51 2912 Royal Dutch Petroleum .32 .19
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. .33 3310 U. S. Steel Corp. - .31 .64
Fruehauf Corp. .73 3713 White Motor Corp. 1.08 - .35
PORTFOLIO //2
Companies Holding Debtor or Creditor








Celanese Corp. 1.98 2801 American Cyanamid Co. .32 1.63
W. R. Grace & Co. 2.00 2801 Rohm & Haas Co. .03 1.97
Airco, Inc. - .21 2803 Inmont Corp. .29 - .50
Atlantic Richfield Co. .75 2912 Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. .57 .18
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. - .05 3310 U. S. Steel Corp. - .35 .30
Fruehauf Corp. .27 3713 White Motor Corp. .05 .22
TRW, Inc. .33 3714 Budd Co. - .36 .69
139
PORTFOLIO #3
Companies Holding Debtor or Creditor








Diamond Intl. Corp. 1.42 2650 Federal Paper Board Co. .19 1.23
Celanese Corp. 3.14 2801 American Cyanamid Co. 1.08 2.06
W. R. Grace & Co. 2.71 2801 Rohm & Haas Co, .22 2.49
GAF Corp. .14 2803 Inmont Corp. .43 - .29
Atlantic Richfield Co. 1.04 2912 Royal Dutch Petroleum C o . 1.00 .04
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. .48 3310 U. S. Steel Corp. - .15 .63
TRW Inc. .67 3714 Budd Co. .56 .11
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PORTFOLIO #4
Companies Holding Debtor or Creditor








Cone Mills Corp. .86 2200 Dan River Inc. .85 .01
Mohasco Corp. .90 2510 Kroehler Mfg. Co. .77 .13
Celanese Corp. .60 2801 American Cyanamid Co. .63 - .03
GAF Corp. .36 2803 Inmont Corp. .31 .05
Atlantic Richfield Co. .84 2912 Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. .42 .42
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. - .20 3310 U. S. Steel - .39 .19
TRW, Inc. .67 3714 Borg-Warner Corp. .02 .65
PORTFOLIO #5
Companies Holding Debtor or Creditor





Numb er Creditor Firm
% HPY 
1963-1967 D.i
Cone Mills Corp. 1.29 2200 Dan River Inc. 1.20 .09
Mohasco Corp. 1.99 2510 Kroehler Mfg. Co. 1.35 .64
Celanese Corp. .89 2801 American Cyanamid Co. .37 .52
Chemetron Corp. 2.05 2803 Koppers C o . 1.14 .91
GAF Corp. .55 2803 Inmont Corp. 1.02 - .47
Atlantic Richfield Co. 1.46 2912 Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. .54 .92
Flintkote Co. .65 2950 National Gypsum Co. .39 .26
Napco Inds. Inc. .69 3714 Budd C o . 1.23 - .54
PORTFOLIO #6
Companies Holding Debtor or Creditor








Cone Mills Corp. .92 2200 Dan River Inc. 1.00 - .08
Mohasco Corp. 2.78 2510 Kroehler Mfg. Co. 1.91 .87
Domtar Ltd. .04 2600 Crown-Zellerbach .23 - .19
GAF Corp. .57 2803 Inmont Corp. 1.43 - .86
Atlantic Richfield Co. 3.45 2912 Standard Oil Co. Ohio 1.62 1.83
Flintkote Co. .45 2950 National Gypsum .60 - .15
Napco Inds. Inc. 2.40 3714 Budd Co. 1.45 .95
DiGiorgio Corp. 1.45 5140 Fleming Co. .86 .59
PORTFOLIO //7
Companies Holding Debtor or Creditor








Con Mills Corp. - .09 220 Dan River Inc. - .09 0
Mohasco Corp. 1.39 2510 Kroehler Mfg. Co. .15 1.24
Domtar Ltd. - .15 2600 Crown-Zellerbach .11 - .26
Celanese Corp. - .05 2801 Stauffer Chemical Co. .04 - .09
Chemtron Corp. .16 2803 Koppers Co. .67 - .51
Atlantic Richfield Co. 2.01 2912 Standard Oil Co. Ohio 1.11 .90
Flintkote Co. .26 2950 National Gypsum .45 - .19
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. - .28 3310 U. S. Steel Co. - .12 - .16
Napco Inds. Inc. 1.13 3714 TRW Inc. 1.72 - .59
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PORTFOLIO #8
Companies Holding Debtor or Creditor








Mohasco Corp. .39 2510 Kroehler Mfg. Co. - .09 .48
Celanese Corp. - .14 2801 Stauffer Chemical Co. - .13 - .01
Chemetron Corp. - .41 2803 Koppers Co. .30 - .71
Atlantic Richfield Co. .98 2913 Standard Oil Co. Ohio .48 .50
Flintkote Co. .61 2950 National Gypsum Co. .62 - .01
Napco Inds. Inc. - .02 3714 TRW, Inc. .59 - .57
Tenneco, Inc. .27 9997 Textron Inc. .33 - .06
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PORTFOLIO #9
Companies Holding Debtor or Creditor








Mohasco Corp. 2.30 2510 Kroehler Mfg. Co. 1.33 .97
W. R. Grace & Co. - .28 2801 Stauffer Chemical Co. .26 - .54
Chemtron Corp. - .27 2803 Koppers Co. .63 - .90
Atlantic Richfield Co. .87 2912 Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. .75 .12
Murphy Oil Corp. .47 2912 British Petroleum Co. .73 - .26
Flintkote Co. 1.23 2950 National Gypsum .70 .53
Wilbiit Corp. .59 3630 Scovill Mfg. Co. .69 - .10
N&qpco Inds. Inc. .02 3714 Budd Co. .25 - .23
Maremont Corp. .97 3714 TRW, Inc. .56 .41
PORTFOLIO #10
Companies Holding Debtor or Creditor








Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. .58 1000 Amax Inc. .22 .36
Warnaco Inc. .38 2300 CluEtt-Peabody & C o .5 Inc. - .03 .41
Mohasco Corp. .46 2510 Kroehler Mfg. Co. .19 .27
Chemetron Corp. - .46 2803 Koppers Co. .20 - .66
Cities Service Co. .23 2912 Standard Oil Co. Ohio .48 - .25
Flintkote Co. .23 2950 National Gypsum Co. .03 .20
Napco Inds. Inc, - .51 3714 Budd Co. - .20 - .31
IT&T .13 9997 Textron Inc. - .26 .39
PORTFOLIO #11
Companies Holding Debtor or Creditor








Warnaco Inc. - .67 2300 Cluett-Peabody & Co. Inc. - .70 .03
Mohasco Corp. - .50 2510 Kroehler Mfg. Co. - .59 .09
Commercial Solvents Corp. - .41 2802 Reiehhold Chemicals Inc. - .48 .07
Chemetron Corp. - .55 2803 Inmont Corp. - .74 .21
Continental Oil Co. .57 2912 Standard Oil Co. Ohio 1.32 - .75
Fintkote Co. - .35 2950 National Gypsum Co. - .44 .09
Dunlop Holding Ltd. - .74 3000 Cooper Tire & Rubber - .55 - .19
Napco Inds. Inc. - .80 3714 Budd Co. - .57 - .23
TRW Inc. - .49 3714 Eaton Corp. - .18 - .31
IT&T - .45 9997 Textron Inc. - .47 .02
PORTFOLIO #12
Companies Holding Debtor or Creditor








Mohasco Corp. - .51 2510 Kroehler Mfg. Co. - .43 - .08
W. R. Grace & Co. .10 2800 Koppers Co. .19 - .09
Sun Chemical Corp. - .64 2890 Inmont Corp. - .55 - .09
Atlantic Richfield Co. .17 2911 Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. .76 - .59
Murphy Oil Corp. .80 2911 British Petroleum Co. Ltd. - .44 1.24
Union Oil Co. of Calif. .25 2911 Standard Oil Co. Ohio .60 - .35
Flintkote Co. - .32 2950 National Gypsum Co. - .41 .09
Uniroyal Inc. - .51 3000 Cooper Tire & Rubber - .51 0
A-T-0 Inc. - .65 3560 Ingersoll-Rand C o . 1.19 -1.84
TRW Inc. - .50 3714 Eaton Corp. - .34 .16
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PORTFOLIO #13
Companies Holding Debtor or Creditor








Mohasco Corp. - .29 2510 Kroehler Mfg. Co. - .46 .17
McGraw-Hill, Inc. - .16 2731 Grolier Inc. - .83 .67
Diamond Shamrock 1.63 2800 Koppers Co. 1.52 .11
Squibb Corp. .04 2830 (G. D.) Searle & Co. .00 .04
Sun Chemical Corp. - .25 2890 Inmont Corp. - .14 - .11
Atlantic Richfield Co. .54 2911 British Petrol. Co. Ltd. .23 .31
Union Oil of Calif. .38 2911 Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. .19 .19
Flintkote Co. - .23 2950 National Gypsum C o . - .31 .08
Benefical Corp. - .31 6145 Liberty Loan Corp. - .77 .46
PORTFOLIO #14
Companies Holding Debtor or Creditor








Foote Mineral Co. 1.51 1000 Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. 1.35 .16
Mohasco Corp. - .43 2510 Kroehler Mfg. Co. - .53 .10
McGraw-Hill Inc. .03 2731 Grolier Inc. - .86 .89
Pennwalt Corp. .46 2800 DuPont (E. I.) DeNemours .11 .35
Continental Oil Co. 1.91 2911 British Petroleum Co. Ltd. .20 1.71
Union Oil Co. of Calif. 1.02 2911 Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. .86 .16
Flintkots Co. - .14 2950 National Gypsum C o . .14 - .28
Sundstrand Corp. .46 3540 Cincinnati Milacron Inc. .00 .46
Ingersoll-Rand Co. .57 3560 Cooper Inds. Inc. .12 .45
Conrac Corp. .15 3662 Raytheon Co. .63 - .48
Eaton Corp. .26 3714 Questor Corp. - .44 S?Q
DiGiorgio Corp. - .40 5140 Super Valu Stores Inc. .83 -1.23
Household Finance Corp. - .24 6145 American Investment Co. - .40 . .,16
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Mohasco Corp. ,44 2510 Kroehler Mfg. Co. .32 .12
McGraw Hill Inc. .42 2731 Grolier Inc. .68 -.26
Diamond Shamrock .39 2800 Koppers Co. .42 -.03
Squibb Corp. .33 2830 (G. D.) Searle & Co. .30 .03
Sun Chemical Corp. .59 2890 Inmont Corp. .39 .20
Atlantic Richfield .32 2911 British Petrol. Co. Ltd. .40 -.08
Union Oil of Calif. .34 2911 Royal Dutch Petrol. Co. .32 .02
Flintkote Co, .27 2950 National Gypsum Co. .19 .08
Benefical Corp. .70 6145 Liberty Loan Corp. .84 -.14
Ln rs;
VITA
James Franklin Potts was born March 3, 1945 in Lampasas, Texas, to 
Uel 0. and Mildred L. Potts. He attended public schools in Lometa, 
Texas, graduating in 1963. That fall he entered Baylor University 
where he was an active member of Alpha Kappa Psi, Omicron Delta Epsilon, 
and president of Beta Gamma Sigma. In his senior year he was awarded 
the Humble Oil Company scholarship.
After receiving a B.B.A. degree in June 1966, Mr. Potts entered 
the graduate program in economics at Baylor as a teaching assistant.
He received an M.S. degree in January 1968, and immediately took a 
full time position at Baylor as an instructor of economics and finance, 
a position which he held until August 1971.
In the fall of 1971 he entered the doctoral program in finance 
at Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, receiving an 
appointment as a teaching assistant in the Department of Finance.
During the summer of 1973 he taught courses in economics and finance 
as an assistant professor at Southeastern University in Hammond, 
Louisiana. From January 1975 through August 1977, Mr. Potts was 
employed as an assistant professor of finance at Baylor, returning 
to L.S.U. that fall as an instructor of finance while completing work 
on his dissertation.
153
E X A M I N A T I O N  A N D  THESIS R E P O R T
Candidate: James F r a n k l in  P o t ts  
Major Field: F in a n c e
T itle  of Thesis: " I n f l a t i o n a r y  E x p e c ta t io n s  and th e  M a rk e t V a lu e  o f  th e  F irm "
Approved:
M ajor Professor and Chairman
h
Dean of the Graduate School
E X A M IN IN G  C O M M IT T E E :  
Don L . W oodland
Wi lani
i l l i a i S ta a ts
ThomasoR. Beard
L o re n  C. S c o tt
Date of Examination: 
May 11, 1978
